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RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS: PENDENT PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB 
Louis J. Capozzi III* 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v. Superior Court of California provides an opportunity to 
reexamine pendent personal jurisdiction in the federal courts. There 
are two types of pendent personal jurisdiction. The first form, 
embraced by federal courts since 1957, is pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction: when a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
as to one anchor claim, it can exercise personal jurisdiction with 
respect to related claims that it could not adjudicate in the anchor 
claim’s absence. This type is especially common where courts have 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of a statute with a 
nationwide service of process provision, like the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. The second type is new. After Bristol-Myers, some 
courts have maintained pendent party personal jurisdiction: where a 
court has specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to a 
particular claim by one plaintiff, it can exercise personal jurisdiction 
as to similar claims brought by different plaintiffs.  
This Article offers an analytical framework to evaluate the 
legitimacy of pendent personal jurisdiction. First, it examines the 
doctrine’s history and evolution, ultimately criticizing the federal 
courts for expanding their own jurisdiction without articulating a 
valid legal warrant. Second, it considers the potential sources of 
authority for federal courts to wield pendent personal jurisdiction, 
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Burbank for advising me throughout the drafting process. I am also grateful to Professors Ryan 
Doerfler and Amy Wax for reading drafts, and to Judge Anthony Scirica, Professor Catherine 
Struve, and Professor Tobias Wolff for discussing ideas and introducing me to the federal courts 
and civil procedure fields. In addition, Joshua Macey, Charles Nary, William Seidleck, and 
Kevin Wynosky generously read drafts. Finally, the Drexel Law Review editorial team was 
essential in moving this Article across the finish line.  
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concluding that all current federal court assertions of pendent 
personal jurisdiction depend on state long-arm statutes, as limited by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the process, this Article seeks to clarify 
how the federal courts issue service of process and exercise personal 
jurisdiction.   
This Article then assesses whether pendent personal jurisdiction 
passes muster under the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases. The 
Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers, justified by interstate federalism 
principles, casts doubt on pendent personal jurisdiction because it 
forbids a court from adjudicating claims unconnected to the forum it 
sits in. Pendent personal jurisdiction often allows courts to breach that 
rule. Therefore, this Article argues that both pendent party and 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction are forbidden. This Article also 
provides broader insights into personal jurisdiction’s relatedness 
element and interstate federalism’s role in limiting the adjudicative 
reach of the nation’s courts within a system of multiple sovereigns.  
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INTRODUCTION: RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS 
Personal jurisdiction has relationship problems. Since the 
inception of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court has 
 
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In subsequent decisions, the Court articulated the three prerequisites 
to a state’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. First, the defendant must “purposefully 
avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Second, the state’s maintenance of specific personal jurisdiction must 
be reasonable, accounting for the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
relief, the forum state’s interest, the interstate judicial system’s interest in the efficient resolution 
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frequently revisited it, but has often done more to muddy the 
doctrinal waters than clarify them.2 For over seventy years, the 
Court had offered little guidance on one of the three elements 
of specific personal jurisdiction: the relatedness element, which 
requires that a claim “arise from” the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum state.  
That changed in June 2017, when the Court handed down its 
opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
California—its sixth decision striking down a state court’s 
assertion of personal jurisdiction since 2011.3 Now, a new battle 
opens. Although Bristol-Myers firmly established that some 
relationship is required between a claim and the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts for a court to exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction, the Court offered limited instruction on how strong 
this relationship must be. Now, litigants are introducing new 
strategies to test the outer limits of specific personal 
jurisdiction’s relatedness element. One prominent strategy is 
this Article’s focus: pendent personal jurisdiction.  
Pendent personal jurisdiction is a mysterious doctrine. For 
decades, few scholars have considered it, and there is no recent, 
authoritative account of what it is or why it exists.4 Even so, 
 
of disputes, and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Third, 
the lawsuit must arise from the defendant’s forum-state contacts. See infra Part III.A. This Article 
focuses only on the third prerequisite.  
2. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to (Partially) 
Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 414 (2018) (“I am tired of writing 
articles complaining about the dismal state of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence—and complain I have.”).  
3. See 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (holding that due process did not permit exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction in California as to claims by non-residents); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (denying assertion of personal jurisdiction by Montana state court 
over FELA claim); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 291 (2014) (denying personal jurisdiction by 
Nevada federal court for lack of minimum contacts); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 
(2014) (establishing a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business as the 
two standard locations where it is amenable to general personal jurisdiction); Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930 (2011) (denying general personal jurisdiction 
in North Carolina because defendant was not “at home” there); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 (2011) (invalidating New Jersey’s assertion of personal jurisdiction 
because the defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the forum). 
4. Few scholars have written about pendent personal jurisdiction, and most of their accounts 
are outdated. One recent, but brief, discussion is given by Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & 
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federal courts have invoked it in hundreds of cases.5 Indeed, 
there are two types of pendent personal jurisdiction. The first, 
embraced by federal courts since 1957, is pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction: when a court has personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant with respect to one claim (the “anchor claim”), it can 
exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as to related claims. This 
form is especially common in cases involving nationwide 
service of process provisions, which courts have interpreted 
broadly to allow personal jurisdiction with respect to related 
state-law claims. After Bristol-Myers, a growing number of 
 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 207, 243–44 (2014). No one else has devoted a detailed discussion in an article to pendent 
personal jurisdiction within the last fifteen years, even as the Court revolutionized its personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence during that time. Further, pendent party personal jurisdiction has 
only truly emerged during the last year. There are a few older accounts, and the great majority 
of them defend the doctrine. See Jason A. Yonan, Note, An End To Judicial Overreaching in 
Nationwide Service of Process Cases: Statutory Authorization to Bring Supplemental Personal 
Jurisdiction Within Federal Courts’ Powers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 559 (concluding “the power to 
create [pendent] personal jurisdiction belongs only to Congress and should not be exercised by 
courts”); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1619, 1662 (2001) (“[I]n most instances there will be no constitutional or statutory 
impediment to the federal court’s exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction . . . .”); Jon Heller, 
Note, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 118 
(1989) (arguing there are no constitutional or statutory obstacles to pendent personal 
jurisdiction); James S. Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal 
Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (1986) (offering a justification for pendent personal 
jurisdiction); Steven Michael Witzel, Note, Removing the Cloak of Personal Jurisdiction from Choice 
of Law Analysis: Pendent Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 127 
(1982) (analyzing pendent personal jurisdiction’s impact on choice-of-law considerations); 
Lewis R. Mills, Pendent Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Service Under the Federal Securities Laws, 70 
COLUM. L. REV. 423, 446 (1970) (defending pendent personal jurisdiction as consistent with the 
federal securities laws); William D. Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 
11 VILL. L. REV. 56, 79-80 (1965) (arguing pendent personal jurisdiction is not authorized by 
statute). A few other scholars mention pendent personal jurisdiction, but do not analyze it in 
depth. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21–22 
(2018); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 
528–29 (2018); Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
1589, 1607–09 (1992).  
5. The term “pendent personal jurisdiction” appears in 466 cases in a Westlaw search. 
Although some of these cases do not extensively discuss it, some courts use other terms like 
“supplemental personal jurisdiction.” This Article focuses on pendent personal jurisdiction in 
the federal courts, though most of its arguments apply with equal force to its exercise in state 
courts. A small number of state court cases have discussed the doctrine. See, e.g., Ex Parte Dill, 
866 So. 2d 519, 538–43 (Ala. 2003) (See, J., dissenting); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming 
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, No. Civ.A. 1456-N, 2006 WL 2588971, at *7 n.73 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 
2006); Swarey v. Stephenson, 112 A.3d 534, 543 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015); Huynh v. Aker 
Biomarine Antarctic AS, No. 74241-8-I, 2017 WL 2242299, at *13 (Wash. Ct. App. May 22, 2017). 
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courts have maintained pendent party personal jurisdiction: 
where a court has specific personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant as to a particular claim by one plaintiff, it can wield 
pendent personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to similar 
claims by different plaintiffs. 
However, courts have not paid careful attention to legal 
sources of authority when exercising pendent personal 
jurisdiction. After concluding that federal law does not 
authorize pendent personal jurisdiction, this Article argues that 
both state and federal courts wishing to maintain pendent 
personal jurisdiction must, under current law, rely on the long-
arm statutes of the states in which they sit. In most cases, 
Congress has not authorized a federal court to exercise more 
personal jurisdiction than the state court across the street. 
Therefore, although some state long-arm statutes permit the full 
extent of personal jurisdiction allowed by the Constitution, the 
Fourteenth Amendment limits both state and federal court 
assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction.  
Applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court’s recent 
decision in Bristol-Myers raises questions about the continued 
viability of pendent personal jurisdiction. The rule of Bristol-
Myers is that a state court cannot adjudicate a claim 
unconnected to it.6 Because Bristol-Myers limits the scope of 
state long-arm statutes, it will have the effect of limiting the 
personal jurisdiction of the state and federal courts. Because 
pendent personal jurisdiction, by definition, enables courts to 
adjudicate claims unconnected to the forum state through an 
anchor claim or party, it is forbidden by Bristol-Myers. This 
Article challenges the precedents upholding pendent claim and 
pendent party personal jurisdiction. The validity of pendent 
personal jurisdiction is an urgent question because of the 
substantial divisions it has created among the federal courts 
within the past year. 
Further, the existence of pendent personal jurisdiction 
implicates important questions about the Court’s specific 
 
6. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82. 
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personal jurisdiction rules. First, what role does interstate 
federalism play in personal jurisdiction? The Court’s decision 
in Bristol-Myers is rooted in interstate federalism principles that 
limit the adjudicative reach of the nation’s courts. At first, it 
might seem counterintuitive that the Fourteenth Amendment 
functions to police assertions of personal jurisdiction in the 
name of interstate federalism. However, examining the 
historical development of personal jurisdiction in our federalist 
legal system, this Article explains how the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects individual liberty by ensuring states do 
not reach beyond their sovereignty. Second, is specific personal 
jurisdiction a claim-specific inquiry? This Article, drawing on 
Bristol-Myers, argues that it must be in order to preserve the line 
between specific and general personal jurisdiction. Third, how 
related must a claim be to the defendant’s forum-state contacts 
to satisfy the relatedness element? Taking a lesson from the 
Court’s choice-of-law jurisprudence, this Article suggests that 
courts should require some connection, without excessively 
policing between potentially competing forums.  
Ultimately, this Article seeks to clarify complicated legal 
questions, focusing almost exclusively on what the law is and 
how it is evolving, as opposed to what the law should be. This 
Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the history of 
pendent personal jurisdiction, explaining how the doctrine 
evolved. Part II analyzes the sources of authority for pendent 
personal jurisdiction. Although courts have distinguished 
between pendent claim personal jurisdiction in nationwide 
service of process cases and otherwise, this Article argues that 
this distinction is untenable because the relevant nationwide 
service provisions cannot be read to permit pendent personal 
jurisdiction.7 Ultimately, after ruling out alternative options, it 
concludes that all assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction by 
the federal courts currently share the same source of authority: 
state long-arm statutes.8 Part III discusses personal 
 
7. See infra Section II.A.3. 
8. See infra Section II.B.  
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jurisdiction’s relatedness element, its refinement in Bristol-
Myers, and its inspiration in interstate federalism. Part IV 
explores pendent personal jurisdiction’s future, ultimately 
concluding that both pendent party and pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction are unlawful, but that courts have an alternative 
jurisdictional option in some situations where pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction has been applied.9 In short, the 
relationship between the federal courts and pendent personal 
jurisdiction must end.  
I. HISTORY OF PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Imagine the following scenario, similar to a real case.10 A 
California company, Capias Corp, and a Virginia company, 
RespondendCo, sign a contract for RespondendCo to provide 
Capias with one hundred computers. The companies negotiate 
the contract entirely in Virginia. Additionally, RespondendCo 
negotiates the same contract with AdCo, an Idaho corporation. 
RespondendCo starts complying with the deals, shipping fifty 
computers to both of its counterparts. Moreover, 
RespondendCo even sends representatives to California to 
ensure Capias’s computers are working properly. But, three 
months into the deals, RespondendCo reneges on both 
obligations to ship fifty additional computers. Thus, Capias and 
AdCo withhold payment for the shipments. RespondendCo’s 
CEO calls his counterpart at Capias’s California headquarters, 
telling him that more computers are on their way, and asks for 
advance payment on them. Separately, RespondendCo’s CEO 
makes the same call to his counterpart at AdCo. Capias and 
AdCo oblige, but no computers ever arrive.  
Capias brings fraud and breach of contract claims in a 
California federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The 
court concludes that it has specific personal jurisdiction as to 
the fraud claim, reasoning that RespondendCo intentionally 
caused harm within California by inducing Capias to pay for 
 
9. See infra Part IV.  
10. Cf. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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computers that were never going to arrive.11 The court, 
however, decides that it cannot independently exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction as to the breach of contract claim, 
reasoning that it did not “arise from” RespondendCo’s 
California contacts because the events leading to the contract’s 
formation occurred in Virginia. Assuming this conclusion is 
right,12 should the court be able to maintain personal 
jurisdiction as to the breach of contract claim? Further, if AdCo 
joins with Capias to bring its fraud claim, can the court wield 
personal jurisdiction as to AdCo’s claim due to its specific 
personal jurisdiction as to Capias’s claim?  
Pendent claim personal jurisdiction allows a court, when it 
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to an 
anchor claim, to maintain personal jurisdiction as to a related 
claim it could not otherwise adjudicate.13 There are two primary 
situations in which pendent claim personal jurisdiction has 
been relevant.14 First are the “nationwide service of process 
cases,” where the court has jurisdiction over the defendant as to 
an anchor claim because of a nationwide service of process 
provision—like that governing Clayton Act claims15—and 
exercises personal jurisdiction with respect to related state or 
federal claims. Most circuits have blessed pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction in these cases.16  Second, a court can have 
 
11. State long-arm statutes frequently authorize specific personal jurisdiction over 
defendants for intentional torts that cause effects in the forum state. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783, 790 (1984).  
12. I return later to whether this analysis is right, and its implications for the doctrine of 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.  
13. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 765, 783 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (citing 
United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
14. Scholars discussing pendent personal jurisdiction have generally split consideration of 
the doctrine between “nationwide service of process cases” and those cases where the court has 
specific personal jurisdiction under a state long-arm statute as to one claim, but not the other 
related ones. See 14a CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2017); Cochran, supra note 4; Rhodes & 
Robertson, supra note 4; Simard, supra note 4, at 1627. This Article ultimately rejects this 
conceptual distinction, but frames the initial discussion as they did.  
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2018). 
16. The few scholars who have considered the doctrine’s legitimacy in this context have 
usually endorsed it. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14 (not questioning its validity); Dodson, 
supra note 4, at 21–22 (arguing that pendent personal jurisdiction has been broadly adopted as 
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specific personal jurisdiction as to one anchor claim through a 
state long-arm statute, and then wield pendent personal 
jurisdiction as to related state or federal claims—as with the 
contract claim in our hypothetical. Fewer courts have 
recognized pendent claim personal jurisdiction in these cases.  
Finally, some courts have embraced a new variant. Pendent 
party personal jurisdiction facilitates the joinder of parties with 
claims similar to those of an anchor party that brought a claim 
the court already had personal jurisdiction over. This 
corresponds to AdCo’s fraud claim in our hypothetical. Because 
courts first developed the doctrine in nationwide service of 
process cases, we will start there. 
A. The Rise of Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction in Nationwide 
Service of Process Cases 
The first applications of pendent claim personal jurisdiction 
were in nationwide service of process cases. Several federal 
statutes, following the lead of the Clayton Act, have provisions 
authorizing nationwide service of process for federal claims.17 
If the facts underlying a plaintiff’s federal claim under, say, the 
Investment Company Act also allow the plaintiff to bring a 
state-law fraud claim, can the court exercise personal 
jurisdiction as to the pendent state-law fraud claim when it 
would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction as to that claim, 
but for the Investment Company Act anchor claim? Inspired by 
pendent subject matter jurisdiction and the Court’s landmark 
decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,18 many courts have 
endorsed pendent claim personal jurisdiction in these 
nationwide service of process cases.   
 
a doctrine accommodating aggregation in complex litigation); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 
4, at 244 (stating that it is the “nearly unanimous view” of courts that this practice is acceptable); 
Simard, supra note 4, at 1636 (analyzing the decisions in several circuits up until 2001 and 
asserting that the practice has achieved “considerable acceptance”). But see Yonan, supra note 4, 
at 578–79 (arguing that statutory authorization is necessary).  
17. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22. The provision actually authorizes worldwide service of process. 
I use the term “nationwide” service of process because the distinction is not particularly 
relevant in this Article. For a list, see infra note 185.  
18. 383 U.S. 715, 742 (1966). 
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The first case where a federal court squarely considered the 
merits of pendent claim personal jurisdiction was Schwartz v. 
Bowman, where the court rejected the concept.19 In Schwartz, the 
plaintiffs brought a federal shareholder derivative claim under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and a state-law claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty in a New York federal court.20 The 
defendants were served out-of-state in Ohio under the 
Investment Company Act’s nationwide service of process 
provision.21 The defendants argued that the court had no 
personal jurisdiction over them with respect to the state-law 
claim.22 Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Schwartz countered by 
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurn v. Oursler, a case 
that allowed pendent subject matter jurisdiction as to a state-law 
claim that was brought with a federal claim.23 The district court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ analogy, stating “it does not follow that, 
because a claim is pendent upon a federal claim for the 
purposes of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the claim is 
pendent for the purposes of jurisdiction over the person.”24 The 
court thus dismissed the plaintiffs’ state-law claims, citing two 
reasons in support of its decision. First, the court thought it 
lacked statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction.25 Second, 
without detailed explanation, the court asserted that a rule of 
pendent personal jurisdiction would inflict “hardship” on the 
defendant.26  
 
19. See 156 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). On appeal, the Second Circuit also considered 
pendent personal jurisdiction, albeit in dictum. Judge Clark favored the concept, arguing it was 
efficient and imposed no burden on the defendant. See Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195, 198 (2d 
Cir. 1959). Judge Moore disagreed, suggesting plaintiffs would abuse such a rule. See id. at 198–
99 (Moore, J., concurring in judgment).  
20. See 156 F. Supp. at 362.  
21. See id.  
22. See id. 
23. See id. at 364–65 (citing Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933)).  
24. Id. at 365.  
25. See id. at 366. 
26. Id.  
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For about a decade after Schwartz, federal district courts 
consistently rejected pendent claim personal jurisdiction.27 But 
starting in the late 1960s, a shift toward acceptance began. For 
example, in Townsend Corp. of America v. Davidson—a case 
resembling Schwartz—the plaintiffs brought a federal 
Investment Company Act claim and a state breach of fiduciary 
duty claim in a New Jersey federal court.28 All defendants were 
served outside New Jersey under the Investment Company 
Act’s nationwide service of process provision.29 Opposing 
personal jurisdiction over them as to the state-law claims, the 
defendants cited Schwartz.30 But citing “judicial economy and 
convenience of the parties,” the court sided with the plaintiffs 
and allowed personal jurisdiction as to the state-law claim.31 In 
the following years, several other district courts followed the 
lead of the Townsend court.32 
The circuit courts soon joined in. In 1973, the Third Circuit 
recognized pendent claim personal jurisdiction in Robinson v. 
Penn Central Co., arguing that the justifications for exercising 
pendent personal jurisdiction paralleled the considerations 
justifying supplemental subject matter jurisdiction: 
“considerations of judicial economy, convenience[,] and 
fairness to litigants.”33 In 1979, the Second Circuit embraced 
 
27. See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Colo. 
1964) (holding that a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process for Securities 
Exchange Act claims did not authorize personal jurisdiction for related state-law 
claims); Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705–06 (D. Mass. 1964); Int’l 
Ladies Garment Workers’ Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Phillips 
v. Murchison, 194 F. Supp. 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 
123, 127 (E.D. Wis. 1959); Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852–53 (E.D. Pa. 1958). For a 
discussion of these early cases, see Cochran, supra note 4, at 1471–72.  
28. 222 F. Supp. 1, 1–2 (D.N.J. 1963).  
29. See id. at 2. 
30. See id. at 4.  
31. See id.  
32. See Puma v. Marriott, 294 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (D. Del. 1969); Sprayregen v. Livingston 
Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (authorizing pendent personal jurisdiction as to 
state-law claim when court had personal jurisdiction from nationwide service of process 
provision in federal securities laws); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 
565–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cooper v. N. Jersey Tr. Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).   
33. 484 F.2d 553, 555–56 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
726 (1966)).  
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pendent claim personal jurisdiction on the simple rationale that 
the Third Circuit’s view was “better reasoned.”34 It is worth 
noting that in all the preceding cases, the pendent state-law 
claim was closely related to the federal claim. Indeed, as some 
circuits continued to embrace pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction, they added the explicit requirement that the 
pendent claim arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as 
the anchor claim.35  
In nationwide service of process cases, pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction has achieved broad acceptance. Pointing 
to earlier precedents as persuasive authority, several other 
circuits have adopted pendent claim personal jurisdiction in 
such cases, including the Fourth,36 Seventh,37 Ninth, 38 Tenth,39 
and Federal Circuits.40 Federal courts across the country have 
continued to apply pendent personal jurisdiction in many 
similar nationwide service of process cases up until the present 
 
34. See Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979). 
35. See, e.g., Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the 
patent statute’s nationwide service of process provision enabled personal jurisdiction as to any 
claims that “arose out of the same core of operative fact as those claims that clearly fell within 
the scope” of the patent statute); cf. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (“The state and federal claims must 
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”). 
36. See, e.g., ESAB Grp., Inc., v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
where a South Carolina federal district court had personal jurisdiction over a New Hampshire 
resident because of the federal RICO statute’s provision for nationwide service of process, it 
could exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as to New Hampshire state-law claims “so long as 
the facts of the federal and state claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact”).  
37. See, e.g., Robinson Eng’g Co. Pension Plan & Tr. v. George, 223 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing pendent personal jurisdiction with respect to state-law claims when court had 
personal jurisdiction from nationwide service of process under the federal securities laws).  
38. See, e.g., Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180–81 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (allowing pendent personal jurisdiction as to state-law antitrust claims when the court 
had jurisdiction as to the Clayton Act anchor claim through a nationwide service provision).  
39. See, e.g., United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Pendent 
personal jurisdiction . . . exists when a court possesses personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
for one claim, lacks an independent basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant for 
another claim that arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, and then, because it possesses 
personal jurisdiction over the first claim, asserts personal jurisdiction over the second claim.”).  
40. See, e.g., Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding pendent 
personal jurisdiction as to a state breach of contract claim that arose from the same nucleus of 
operative fact as a federal patent claim with a nationwide service of process provision).  
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day, and several have applied it since Bristol-Myers.41 So far, no 
circuit has since reconsidered its cases in this area.  
B. Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction Beyond Nationwide Service 
of Process Cases 
What about when a court has specific personal jurisdiction as 
to one claim through a state long-arm statute–with no 
nationwide service of process provision in play—but not as to 
other related claims? For an example, recall the fraud and 
breach of contract claims in our ongoing hypothetical. Even 
though both claims arose from the same business relationship, 
our hypothetical court concluded only the fraud claim was 
sufficiently connected to California, and that the breach of 
contract claim did not arise from RespondendCo’s California 
contacts. Assuming that’s right, the question is whether a 
California court could adjudicate the two claims together 
anyway. Usually, these cases arise in the context of diversity 
jurisdiction, though it is also possible for the court to have 
specific personal jurisdiction over one federal claim, but not 
related federal or state-law claims.42 Courts have divided on the 
doctrine’s validity in this context.   
Several federal courts have embraced pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction outside the nationwide service of process context. 
 
41. See, e.g., Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, 16-cv-6496 (LAK), 2018 WL 6169313, at *58 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) (exercising pendent personal jurisdiction as to state-law claims where 
plaintiffs had anchor claims under the Clayton Act); Hosp. Auth. of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville 
v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., No. 3:15-1100, 2017 WL 6381434, at *3–4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2017) 
(recognizing validity of pendent claim personal jurisdiction with anchor claim under the 
Clayton Act); Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, No. 16-4001, 2017 WL 3822727, at *3–4 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 30, 2017) (exercising pendent claim jurisdiction as to related state-law claims when it had 
jurisdiction over defendant as to RICO claim under the RICO statute); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 
252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 154–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction as 
to related state-law claims when the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant for a 
claim under the Anti-Terrorism Act).  
42. See, e.g., Noble Sec., Inc. v. MIZ Eng’g, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 2d 513, 553–56 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction as to a federal Lanham Act claim through a 
federal RICO claim); Alcohol Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Actsoft, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1253 
(D. Colo. 2010) (exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction as to direct patent infringement 
claims through related indirect patent infringement claims); Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas 
Plc., 901 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (holding pendent claim personal jurisdiction applies 
to related federal claims in addition to related state-law claims).  
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The first appellate court to do so was the Second Circuit in 
Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc.43 Hargrave involved a dispute 
between a New York vineyard and Oki Nursery, a California 
provider of grape vines that allegedly sold bad vines to 
Hargrave.44 Hargrave brought a New York fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim and five contract law claims against 
Oki in a New York federal court, invoking diversity 
jurisdiction.45 The court, finding that Oki targeted New York 
and externally caused harm within the state, held that specific 
personal jurisdiction existed as to the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim.46 The court then allowed pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction as to the five contract claims.47 In 
justifying its decision, the court reasoned that the same policy 
considerations supporting pendent subject matter jurisdiction 
favored pendent claim personal jurisdiction.48 In an interesting 
interpretive move (analyzed in more detail below), the court 
interpreted the diversity statute—28 U.S.C. § 1332—to 
authorize pendent personal jurisdiction.49 
Since then, several other courts have applied pendent 
personal jurisdiction in such cases.50 Even after Bristol-Myers, 
 
43. 636 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1980). 
44. See id.   
45. See id. 
46. See id. at 899–900. 
47. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1981).   
48. See id. at 720.  
49. See id. at 719.  
50. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Mackzilla, L.L.C., H-15-2425, 2016 WL 1059529, at *6 
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2016) (“[T]he use of pendent personal jurisdiction may be equally or even 
more justified in some diversity cases than in federal question cases with a mix of federal and 
state law claims.”); Inspirus, L.L.C. v. Egan, No. 4-11-CV-417-A, 2011 WL 4439603, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Sept. 20, 2011) (allowing pendent claim personal jurisdiction as to two state-law claims the 
court did not independently have personal jurisdiction for when it had personal jurisdiction as 
to a related breach of contract claim); Pension Advisory Grp. Ltd. v. Cty. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. 
Supp. 2d 680, 695–96 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Rosenburg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 
1037 (N.D. Wash. 1999); Anderson v. Century Prods. Co., 943 F. Supp. 137 (D.N.H. 1996) 
(holding that pendent personal jurisdiction allowed the court to exercise personal jurisdiction 
as to contract claim in case where the court had specific personal jurisdiction with respect to a 
related tort claim); Salpoglu v. Widder, 899 F. Supp. 835 (D. Mass. 1995) (exercising pendent 
personal jurisdiction as to a breach of contract claim when the court already had jurisdiction 
from a malpractice claim); Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 763 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(exercising personal jurisdiction as to retaliatory discharge and defamation claims because the 
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courts have applied pendent claim personal jurisdiction outside 
the nationwide service of process context.51 
Other courts have declined to apply pendent personal 
jurisdiction in the absence of a nationwide service of process 
provision. The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected it in Seiferth v. 
Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., where the plaintiff brought tort 
claims against Camus, a Tennessee engineer, in a Mississippi 
federal court under diversity jurisdiction.52 Seiferth was the 
victim of a helicopter accident in Mississippi. Camus had 
designed the defective part in Florida, but he installed it in 
Mississippi.53 The plaintiff’s estate brought four claims against 
Camus: defective design, failure to warn, negligence, and 
negligence per se.54 After concluding it had specific personal 
jurisdiction as to the failure to warn, negligence, and negligence 
per se claims, the court also reasoned that the defective design 
claim did not “arise out of” Camus’s contacts with 
Mississippi.55 The court confronted as an issue of “first 
impression” whether “specific jurisdiction is a claim-specific 
inquiry.”56  
The court answered this question affirmatively, rejecting 
pendent personal jurisdiction and dismissing the defective 
design claim.57 It reasoned that its conclusion “flow[ed] 
logically from the distinction between general and specific 
jurisdiction.”58 It then rejected pendent personal jurisdiction, 
asserting that “[p]ermitting the legitimate exercise of specific 
 
court had specific personal jurisdiction as to the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim); Home 
Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (D. Mass. 1988) (“[I]n 
a multi-count complaint, if a court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to 
one count, it has personal jurisdiction with respect to all counts . . . .”). 
51. See Hicks v. Jayco, Inc., 1:16 CV1236, 2018 WL 1363843, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2018); 
Doe v. Cotterman, No. 17 C 58, 2018 WL 1235014, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2018); Knowledge 
Based Sols., Inc. v. Renier, 2017 WL 3913129, at *9–11 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2017); Miller v. Native 
Link Constr., LLC., No. 15-1605, 2017 WL 3536175, at *29 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017).  
52. See 472 F.3d 266, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2006). 
53. See id. at 270.  
54. See id. at 274.  
55. Id. at 275–76.  
56. Id. at 274. 
57. See id. at 275-75. 
58. See id. at 274. 
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jurisdiction over one claim to justify the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction over a different claim that does not arise out of or 
relate to the defendant's forum contacts would violate the Due 
Process Clause.”59 The Fifth Circuit did not engage with 
precedents from other circuits, like Hargrave, that had embraced 
the doctrine. 
Several other federal courts have declined to extend pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction beyond the nationwide service of 
process context.60  
C. Pendent Party Personal Jurisdiction 
As discussed below, the Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers 
limits a court to adjudicating claims connected with the forum 
where it sits. Sensing an opportunity, class action defendants 
around the country facing claims by out-of-state plaintiffs 
moved to dismiss them for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing 
the Court’s decision. Dozens of courts have addressed these 
motions, and they are deeply divided on the scope of Bristol-
Myers. Some have granted dismissal, reasoning that the Court 
requires a connection between each claim and the forum state 
for personal jurisdiction to exist. Others have denied the 
motions. Some cases invoke the doctrine of pendent party 
 
59. See id. at 275. 
60. See, e.g., Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2001) (declaring the district 
court must find that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant as to each of the plaintiff’s 
claims); Philips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(“Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims asserted.”); MG 
Design Assocs. v. CoStar Realty Info. Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1016–23 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (looking 
at personal jurisdiction separately for all claims); Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc. v. Anchorage 
Advisors, LLC., No. 3-11-CV-1416-PK, 2012 WL 3637551, at *9 (D. Or. July 9, 2012) (rejecting 
pendent personal jurisdiction because it would “effectively swallow the distinction between 
general and specific personal jurisdiction”); Figawi, Inc. v. Horan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77–78 (D. 
Mass. 1998) (refusing to apply pendent personal jurisdiction and rejecting the analogy to subject 
matter jurisdiction); Milford Power Ltd. P’ship v. New Eng. Power Co., 918 F. Supp. 471, 479–
80 (D. Mass. 1996) (refusing to consider personal jurisdiction as to claims that did not arise from 
the defendant’s forum-state contacts even though plaintiff met burden with respect to other 
claims in the same controversy); see also Simard, supra note 4, at 1641–42 (discussing Milford and 
Figawi). Remick means the Third Circuit is the only circuit that accepts pendent personal 
jurisdiction in the context of a federal claim with a nationwide service of process statute, 
Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555–56 (3d Cir. 1979), but rejects it otherwise. See 
Remick, 238 F.3d at 255. This Article will explore whether this distinction withstands scrutiny.  
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personal jurisdiction by name (analogizing to pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction in the process).61 Others courts have not, 
but have reasoned that they can adjudicate the claims of 
plaintiffs unrelated to the state they sit in because they have 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to another plaintiff’s 
similar claim. In other words, they are effectively exercising 
pendent party personal jurisdiction.  
These courts have advanced three rationales. First, some 
courts conclude that Bristol-Myers only applies to state courts, 
not federal ones. Second, some courts concede that Bristol-Myers 
applies to federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, but 
maintain it is irrelevant to courts exercising federal question 
jurisdiction. Third, some courts acknowledge that Bristol-Myers 
applies to federal courts, but not to class actions. The division 
between these courts is stark.  
1. Division on whether Bristol-Myers applies to federal courts 
An example of the first camp is Sloan v. General Motors LLC, 
where a federal court wielded pendent party personal 
jurisdiction after concluding Bristol-Myers does not apply to 
federal courts.62 California plaintiffs brought a putative class 
action for design defects in cars purchased in California under 
both state and federal law. General Motors did not question the 
court’s personal jurisdiction as to the claims of the California 
plaintiffs.63 Plaintiffs from four other states also sought to bring 
the same claims arising from purchases in their respective 
states.64 Even though the court acknowledged those claims had 
no “independent relationship” with the defendant’s California 
contacts, it exercised personal jurisdiction as to them.65 The 
court acknowledged that its decision stood in tension with 
Bristol-Myers, but determined that the Court’s reasoning only 
 
     61.  See, e.g., Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 858–59 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Allen 
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). 
62. See 287 F. Supp. 3d at 858–59.  
63. See id. at 853. 
64. See id. at 856. 
65. See id. at 857–58. 
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applied to state courts, not federal courts, because of its 
emphasis on interstate federalism.66 The court reasoned that, 
especially since it had federal question jurisdiction because of 
the plaintiffs’ Magnuson Moss Warranty Act claims, “the due 
process analysis does not incorporate the interstate sovereignty 
concerns that animated Bristol-Myers and which may be 
‘decisive’ in a state court’s analysis.”67 In somewhat confused 
reasoning, the court then stated the plaintiffs’ claims must still 
relate to the defendant’s contacts with California, and 
acknowledged they did not.68 However, citing the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Action Embroidery, the court reasoned the 
jump from pendent claim to pendent party personal jurisdiction 
was not significant.69 The court also cited the case’s status as a 
putative class action, impliedly recognizing that nationwide 
class actions would not be possible against defendants in states 
where they are not amenable to general personal jurisdiction  
without pendent party personal jurisdiction.70   
However, several other courts have concluded that Bristol-
Myers does govern federal courts, not just the state courts. For 
example, in Muir v. Nature’s Bounty (DE), Inc., an Illinois federal 
court considered state-law claims by plaintiffs from California, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania who sought to join with Illinois 
plaintiffs in alleging consumer fraud against Nature’s Bounty, 
a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 
New York.71 Although the court had specific personal 
jurisdiction as to the claims of the Illinois plaintiffs (who bought 
their products in Illinois), it decided it lacked personal 
 
66. See id. at 858–59. 
67. Id. at 859. 
68. See id. at 859–60. Logically, if Bristol-Myers only applied to state courts, then a relation 
between each claim and the forum state when a federal court exercises personal jurisdiction 
should not be necessary.  
69. See id. at 860 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit did not limit its holding in Action Embroidery to 
situations involving the same parties. Rather, it focused on whether the new claims arose out of 
the same nucleus of operative facts, not whether the claims belonged to the same plaintiffs.”). 
70. See id. at 861 (“[T]his is a putative nationwide class action. The Court may well have 
jurisdiction over absent class members (including the named out-of-state plaintiffs) who are 
non-forum residents in any event.”). 
71. See No. 15 C 9835, 2018 WL 3647115, at *1 (N.D. Ill. August 1, 2018).  
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jurisdiction as to the out-of-state claims because of Bristol-
Myers.72 The plaintiffs argued for pendent party personal 
jurisdiction (citing old pendent claim personal jurisdiction 
cases), but the court concluded Bristol-Myers prohibited that.73 
The court first acknowledged the argument for not extending 
Bristol-Myers, which reversed a state court judgment:  
 
Arguably, the interstate federalism concerns 
underlying [Bristol-Myers] play out differently in 
federal court, where it is the coercive power of the 
United States, rather than the coercive power of 
another state, to which a defendant is asked to 
submit. So long as a defendant has sufficient contacts 
with the United States, the Constitution might not 
prohibit . . . pendent personal jurisdiction.74  
 
However, the court explained that it was bound by Bristol-
Myers because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
federal courts to rely on state law, thus subjecting them to the 
constitutional limits on state courts articulated in Bristol-
Myers.75 It also noted that several other courts have performed 
the same analysis.76 Outside the class-action context, several 
other district courts have considered pendent party personal 
jurisdiction and refused to embrace it.77 
 
72. Id. at *5.  
73. See id. at *4. 
74. Id. (citations omitted). 
75. See id. at *5. 
76. See id. at *4–5.  
77. See, e.g., Roy v. Fed-Ex Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-30116-KAR, 2018 WL 
2324092, at *11 (D. Mass. May 22, 2018) (dismissing out-of-state unpaid overtime claims brought 
under the FLSA); Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at 
*14–16 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) (dismissing out-of-state claims brought under Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act); BeRousse v. Janssen Research & Dev., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00716-DRH, 2017 
WL4255075 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (dismissing out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims); Spratley v. FCA 
U.S. LLC, 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). Several cases pre-
dated Bristol-Myers. See Famular v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 CV 944 (VB), 2017 WL 2470844, at *5–6 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2017); DeMaria v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15 C 3321, 2016 WL 374145 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 1, 2016); Tulsa Cancer Inst., PLLC v. Genentech Inc., No. 15-CV-157-TCK-TLW, 2016 
WL 141859 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2016). 
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2. Division on whether Bristol-Myers applies in diversity and 
federal question cases 
Another rationale suggests that Bristol-Myers does not apply 
to courts exercising federal question jurisdiction. For example, 
in In re Packaged Seafood Products Antitrust Litigation, a California 
federal court considered antitrust claims against an 
international company only subject to general personal 
jurisdiction in the United Kingdom.78 The court had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to a putative class 
of direct purchasers under the Clayton Act’s nationwide service 
of process provision. Stating the obvious, the court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction as to those claims arose from a federal 
question. But the court then questioned whether it could 
exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as to the out-of-state 
indirect purchaser claims brought under state law. The court 
acknowledged a “general consensus [that] because Bristol-
Myers dealt with limits on state sovereign power within a 
federal system, its reasoning is applicable to federal courts 
sitting in diversity.”79  
But the court reasoned that the “due process concerns are 
different” when a federal court is exercising federal question 
jurisdiction.80 Because it was exercising federal question 
jurisdiction as to the direct purchaser claims, the court reasoned 
that pendent party personal jurisdiction as to the out-of-state 
indirect purchaser claims was appropriate, given that they 
arose from the same alleged antitrust conspiracy as the federal 
direct purchaser claims, enabling the court to adjudicate all the 
claims before it.81 Although they did not rely on this rationale, 
a couple of other courts have suggested agreement that Bristol-
Myers does not apply to federal question jurisdiction cases.82 
 
78. No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 2018 WL 4222506, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018).  
79. See id. at *32.  
80. See id. 
81. See id. (citing policy advantages such as judicial economy, avoidance of piecemeal 
litigation, and overall convenience of the parties).  
82. See Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (noting that the 
court had federal question jurisdiction under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act to strengthen 
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Other courts have relied on Bristol-Myers to dismiss claims 
while exercising federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, the logic 
of these cases closely resembles that in the cases where federal 
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction rejected pendent 
personal jurisdiction. For example, in Roy v. FedEx Ground 
Package System, Inc., a Massachusetts district court dismissed 
out-of-state claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
for lack of personal jurisdiction.83 The court cited the rule that 
“before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant in a federal question case, there must be 
authorization for service of summons on the defendant” in state 
law or a specific federal statute.84 Because the FLSA did not 
authorize service of process, the court relied on Massachusetts’s 
long-arm statute to wield personal jurisdiction, thus bringing 
Bristol-Myers (which limits the reach of the long-arm statute) 
into play.85 Other courts have reached the same conclusion.86  
3. Division on whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions 
Third, several federal courts have exercised pendent party 
personal jurisdiction in class actions. In Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. 
Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., California plaintiffs brought a 
nationwide class action against Dr. Pepper in a California 
federal court.87 After Bristol-Myers, Dr. Pepper argued the court 
lacked specific personal jurisdiction over it as to the claims of 
 
its decision to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple 
Grp., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (citing considerations 
unique to diversity jurisdiction in support of argument that Bristol-Myers applies to federal 
courts “in cases that are before them solely on the basis of diversity”).  
83. See No. 3:17-cv-30116-KAR, 2018 WL 2324092 (D. Mass. May 22, 2018). 
84. See id. at *3 (quotations omitted) (quoting Pike v. Clinton Fishpacking, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 
2d 162, 166 (D. Mass. 2001)). I discuss the relationship between service of process and personal 
jurisdiction below. See infra notes 144–84 and accompanying text. Although service of process 
is not the same thing as personal jurisdiction, the former is a prerequisite to the latter. 
85. See id. at *3–5. 
86. See, e.g., Roy, 2018 WL 2324092, at *9 (rejecting out-of-state claims brought under FLSA); 
Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at *14–16 (D.N.J. Apr. 
25, 2018) (dismissing out-of-state Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims). 
87. See 2017 WL 4224723, at *1–2. 
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the non-California class members.88 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that Bristol-Myers did not apply to federal 
courts—at least those sitting in diversity—but concluded 
instead that it did not apply to class actions.89 The court 
reasoned that, unlike in mass actions, absent class members are 
not full parties in interest, thus making Bristol-Myers 
distinguishable; the court acknowledged that its decision 
allowed plaintiffs to “manipulate[] the[ir] complaint so as to not 
run afoul” of the Court’s decision.90  
Several other courts have likewise determined Bristol-Myers 
does not apply to class actions.91 It is noteworthy that several of 
these courts concluded that Bristol-Myers applies to federal 
courts, but not to class actions.92 This divide appears most 
starkly in Molock v. Whole Foods Market. There, the court 
dismissed out-of-state claims by named plaintiffs in a putative 
class action but maintained personal jurisdiction with respect to 
the in-state named plaintiffs’ class claims, effectively exercising 
pendent party personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to 
out-of-state claims from across the country.93   
In class actions, other courts have refused to wield pendent 
party personal jurisdiction since Bristol-Myers, creating a 
substantial split. For example, in Cirque du Soleil, an Illinois 
plaintiff brought a putative nationwide class action under the 
 
88. See id. at *3. The parties agreed the court did not have general personal jurisdiction.  
89. See id. at *4.  
90. See id. at *5.  
91. See Allen v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *4–8 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00085, 2018 WL 3580775, at *6 
(W.D. Va. July 25, 2018); Garcia v. Peterson, 319 F. Supp. 3d 863, 880 (S.D. Tex. 2018); Becker v. 
HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Tickling Keys, Inc. v. Transamerica 
Fin. Advisors, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1350–51 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Weisheit v. Rosenberg & 
Assocs., LLC., No. JKB-17-0823, 2018 WL 1942196, at *15 (D. Md. Apr. 25, 2018); Casso’s 
Wellness Store & Gym, L.L.C. v. Spectrum Lab. Prods., No. 17-2161, 2018 WL 1377608, at *5 
(E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2018); Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2018); 
Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2018); In 
re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 30, 2017); see also Swamy v. Title Source, Inc., No. 17-0117, 2017 WL 5196780, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 10, 2017) (concluding Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions).  
92. See, e.g., Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126–27; Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5; see 
also Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *5–6 (acknowledging the division and reserving the question). 
93. See Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126. 
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Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in an Illinois 
federal court.94 Although the court granted class certification, it 
limited the class to Illinois citizens, concluding Bristol-Myers 
barred it from exercising personal jurisdiction as to the out-of-
state class members’ claims.95 With no nationwide service of 
process provision in the TCPA, the court explained that it had 
to assert personal jurisdiction under state law.96 This meant the 
Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases (including 
Bristol-Myers) limited the court, even though it exercised federal 
question jurisdiction.97 Because the out-of-state class members’ 
claims had no connection to Illinois, the court dismissed them.98 
Several other district courts have reached the same conclusion.99  
In summary, there is a substantial split on the validity and 
scope of pendent party personal jurisdiction among the federal 
courts after Bristol-Myers. As this Article heads to the printer, no 
court of appeals has directly considered the doctrine’s validity, 
though the Seventh Circuit recently highlighted the question of 
whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions in an interlocutory 
 
94. See Practice Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 844–
46 (N.D. Ill. 2018).  
95. See id. at 860–62. 
96. See id. at 862. 
97. See id. at 861–62. Contra Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. 
2018).  
98. See Cirque du Soleil, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 864. 
99. See, e.g., Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191, at *9–11 (N.D. 
Ill. May 16, 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
18, 2018); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Nothing 
in Bristol–Myers suggests that it does not apply to named plaintiffs in a putative class action; 
rather, the Court announced a general principal—that due process requires a ‘connection 
between the forum and the specific claims at issue.’ That principle applies with equal force 
whether or not the plaintiff is a putative class representative.”); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way 
Prods., LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Wenokur v. AXA 
Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV-17-00165-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Az. Oct. 2, 
2017) (“The Court also notes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims of putative class 
members with no connection to Arizona and therefore would not be able to certify a nationwide 
class.”); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., No. 16–696, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
20, 2017) (“The constitutional requirements of due process do[] not wax and wane when the 
complaint is individual or on behalf of a class. Personal jurisdiction in class actions must 
comport with due process just the same as any other case.”); see also Demedicics v. CVS Health 
Corp., No. 16-cv-5973, 2017 WL 569157, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2017) (refusing to exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction as to out-of-state class members’ claims before Bristol-Myers).  
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appeal and declined to address it, since the parties had not 
argued the issue before the district court.100  
D. Observations on the Rise of Pendent Personal Jurisdiction 
A few observations about the doctrine’s evolution are in 
order. First, early courts usually embraced pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction based on an analogy to the Supreme 
Court’s articulation of pendent subject matter jurisdiction in 
Gibbs. However, these early decisions often failed to give 
coherent reasoning or acknowledge the significant differences 
between personal and subject matter jurisdiction.101  
Second, later courts that accepted pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction, including the appellate courts, often relied 
uncritically on earlier precedents from other courts. For 
example, the D.C. Circuit adopted pendent personal 
jurisdiction in one paragraph featuring a citation to Gibbs,102 a 
footnote collecting precedents, an unsupported statement that 
cases upholding the doctrine were “better reasoned” than those 
rejecting it, and a cursory assertion that pendent personal 
jurisdiction facilitated enforcement of the federal statute.103 As 
another example, the Second Circuit adopted the doctrine two 
years later in a footnote that collected cases and summarily 
concluded that the pro-jurisdiction cases were “better 
reasoned” than the contrary ones.104  
Third, pendent party personal jurisdiction is provoking 
significantly more controversy and division among the lower 
courts than its pendent claim cousin. The biggest divide is on 
whether Bristol-Myers limits multistate class actions.   
 
     100.   See Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1024–25 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is not 
for us to take the first bite of this apple.”). 
101. For a convincing critique of the reasoning in the earliest pendent personal jurisdiction 
cases, see Ferguson, supra note 4, at 72 (“In summary, few of the decisions have really analyzed 
the issue and the arguments on both sides and come to a reasoned conclusion.”).  
102. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). 
103. Id. at 5. 
104. Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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Fourth, courts generally have not articulated a source of 
authority for both types of pendent personal jurisdiction, 
usually relying solely on precedent and free-floating public 
policy considerations. Before returning to the doctrine’s legality 
below,105 the following Part takes up the project that courts have 
overlooked: finding a source of authority for pendent personal 
jurisdiction.   
II. THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY FOR PENDENT PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
As the previous Part documents, pendent personal 
jurisdiction has a dubious origin. Federal courts embraced it 
without paying careful attention to their authority to do so. In 
brief, early courts analogized pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction to pendent subject matter jurisdiction; later courts 
then uncritically relied on earlier precedents to fuel its 
expansion; and more recently, courts are expanding pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction to allow pendent party personal 
jurisdiction, usually to enable multistate class actions.   
This Article questions the federal courts’ authority to adopt 
pendent personal jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court’s 
recent personal jurisdiction cases focused primarily on 
constitutional limits, personal jurisdiction is first and foremost 
statutory law. As with subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts 
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction without statutory or rule-
based authority.106 More specifically, federal courts have long 
understood service of process to be a prerequisite to personal 
jurisdiction, and that statutory authorization is required for a 
court to issue process.107  
 
105. See infra Part IV.   
106. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 (1987) (citing the 
“unmalleable principle of law that federal courts must ground their personal jurisdiction on a 
federal statute or rule” (quoting Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 
423 (5th Cir. 1986))); ESAB Grp. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Federal 
district courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction only to the degree authorized by Congress 
acting under its constitutional power to ‘ordain and establish’ the lower federal courts.”). 
107. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1556 (2017) (“[A]bsent consent, a basis for 
service of a summons on the defendant is prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”); 
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There are two primary ways that federal courts can exercise 
personal jurisdiction through service of process. First, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) specifies the default rule: a 
federal court can maintain personal jurisdiction following 
service of process when authorized by the jurisdictional statute 
of the state where it sits.108 Second, as recognized by Rule 
4(k)(1)(C), Congress has the power to expand personal 
jurisdiction from this default in particular federal statutes.109   
This Part addresses the possible sources of authority for 
pendent personal jurisdiction. First, Section II.A considers 
whether the federal courts can rely on federal law to wield it, 
ultimately concluding they may not. Second, Section II.B 
explains that, at least in some states, the federal courts can rely 
on state long-arm statutes to maintain pendent personal 
jurisdiction, subject only to constitutional limits. Section II.C 
clarifies that, under current law, the assertion of both pendent 
claim and pendent party personal jurisdiction depends on the 
same source of authority: the state long-arm statutes.  
A. Federal Statutory or Rule-Based Authority 
Some courts have concluded that they had affirmative 
authority to apply pendent claim personal jurisdiction because 
of a federal statute or rule. No scholars or courts have yet 
claimed that a federal statute or rule authorizes pendent party 
personal jurisdiction, so this section focuses on pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction.  
 
Omni, 484 U.S. at 111 (“In summary, the District Court may not exercise jurisdiction . . . without 
authorization to serve process.”); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444–46 (1946) 
(describing how service of process is the mechanism by which a federal court maintains 
statutorily-authorized personal jurisdiction); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS 
BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE THEORY AND PRACTICE 180–81 (4th ed. 2013). 
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
109. See id. 4(k)(1)(C). There is a third way, though it arises in a relatively limited number of 
cases. If a party is joined under Rule 19 as a required party or Rule 14, process can be served on 
a party not more than one hundred miles away from the relevant district court. See id. 4(k)(1)(B).   
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Congress has the power to authorize nationwide service of 
process.110 Indeed, it has done so for certain claims under 
particular federal statutes. However, the Supreme Court has a 
longstanding rule that it will construe congressional extensions 
of service of process narrowly.111 In Omni, the Court reaffirmed 
this principle: because Congress knows it has the power to 
establish nationwide service of process, the Court stated it will 
not presume Congress intended to permit nationwide service of 
process unless it does so explicitly.112 
Scholars and courts have proposed three bases for concluding 
that federal law enables pendent claim personal jurisdiction: the 
subject matter jurisdiction statutes, Rule 4, and the nationwide 
service of process provisions in particular federal statutes. This 
section ultimately argues that no federal statute or rule blesses 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction, leaving state statutes as the 
only potential source of authority for it. Additionally, this 
section challenges the distinction, made by some courts and 
scholars, between the legitimacy of pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction in cases involving a nationwide service of process 
provision and in cases without one.113 For this to be true, one 
 
     110.  See Omni, 484 U.S. at 103–04; Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) 
(“Congress has power, likewise, to provide that the process of every [d]istrict [c]ourt shall run 
into every part of the United States.”). 
111. See Robertson, 268 U.S. at 627 (“It is not lightly to be assumed that Congress intended to 
depart from a long established policy” of personal jurisdiction rules).  
112. See 484 U.S. at 106 (“It would appear that Congress knows how to authorize nationwide 
service of process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do so here argues 
forcefully that such authorization was not its intention.”). Omni and Robertson seem to articulate 
a clear statement rule for service of process statutes, or at least command cautious, narrow 
interpretations. To date, no scholar considering pendent personal jurisdiction has seen 
Robertson’s or Omni’s rule of narrow construction as relevant. Without citing either case, Heller 
asserts the opposite principle. See Heller, supra note 4, at 131 (“Such an inquiry is especially 
proper here because statutes that extend the jurisdiction of the courts, as nationwide service of 
process statutes do, are to be broadly construed.”).  
113. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14; Cochran, supra note 4, at 1489–92 (arguing for different 
analyses for nationwide service of process cases and cases where a state long-arm statute is used 
to gain pendent personal jurisdiction); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 4, at 244–46 (describing 
nationwide service of process cases as being on the least controversial end of a “spectrum,” with 
other cases being more controversial on the spectrum); Simard, supra note 4, at 1627–31. But see 
Yonan, supra note 4, at 571–72 (arguing for narrow interpretations of four nationwide service of 
process provisions because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Finley, where the Court declined 
to read the subject matter jurisdiction statute broadly).  
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must interpret the nationwide service of process provisions to 
permit pendent claim personal jurisdiction. Section II.A.3 
argues that interpretation is not plausible.    
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367 
In Hargrave, the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1332, the primary statutes for federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
gave it the authority to assert pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction.114 First, the Second Circuit concluded that New 
York’s long-arm statute only enabled personal jurisdiction as to 
the plaintiff’s fraud claim, not his related contract claims.115 As 
the court framed it, “The question is whether Congress has 
authorized the district court” to adjudicate the contract 
claims.116 The court then acknowledged that Rule 4(e)—now 
4(k)(1)(A)—did not allow jurisdiction either.117 In a remarkable 
move, the court then turned to the federal statutes establishing 
subject matter jurisdiction, sections 1331 and 1332.118 The court 
noted that, in both statutes, Congress authorized jurisdiction 
over “actions,” either between citizens of different states or 
those arising under federal laws or the Constitution.119 The 
court, citing Gibbs, noted that the term “action” has been 
understood in some contexts to mean “the entire 
controversy.”120 Therefore, the court interpreted sections 1331 
and 1332 to permit a district court to exercise pendent personal 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire “action.”121 Similarly, at 
least one court has argued that the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute—28 U.S.C. § 1367—enables pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction.122 
 
114. See 646 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1980). 
115. See id. at 718–19. 
116. See id.  
117. See id.  
118. See id. at 719.  
119. See id.  
120. Id. 
121. Id.  
122. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796, 
804 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
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There are two fundamental problems with this approach. 
First, the language of sections 1331, 1332, and 1367 refers to only 
one type of jurisdiction, long understood to be subject matter 
jurisdiction.123 These sections make no reference to personal 
jurisdiction or “service of process,” which Congress has 
codified as a separate prerequisite to federal jurisdiction since 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.124 Second, this approach would render 
pointless all the separate federal statutory provisions defining 
the scope of service of process. In short, rooting authority for 
pendent personal jurisdiction in sections 1331, 1332, or 1367 
would overturn the longtime understanding that Congress 
authorizes subject matter and personal jurisdiction separately.  
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) 
Professor Linda Simard has proposed a different, but 
ultimately unpersuasive, source of authority: Rule 4. As she 
points out, the language of Rule (4)(k)(1) says that service of 
process under the section “establish[es personal] jurisdiction 
over the person of a defendant,” not that it establishes personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant as to a particular claim.125 She 
suggests that the rulemakers’ decision not to use the word 
“claim” is especially notable since they used the term in Rule 
(4)(k)(2).126 She concludes that Rule 4 is ambiguous, and then 
says policy arguments should push us to favor the broader 
interpretation.127  
 
123. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1069.7 (“Neither the plain meaning of this 
statute, which shows it to be a subject matter jurisdiction provision, nor its legislative          
history supports the conclusion that Congress intended [s]ection 1367 to 
include personal jurisdiction.”); cf. BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (2017) (concluding 
that similar language in FELA refers only to subject matter jurisdiction, and not to personal 
jurisdiction). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 778–84, 1413–14 (7th ed. 2015).   
124. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1987) (reasoning 
that congressional authorization of subject matter jurisdiction alone is not sufficient to confer 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant). For more on the Judiciary Act, see infra note 151.  
125. Simard, supra note 4, at 1645–46. 
126. Id. at 1646.  
127. See id. at 1646–48. She attempts to ground her policy argument in the rules. First, Simard 
observes that Rule 1 commands that rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the 
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But even if Rule 4 is ambiguous, that ambiguity does not give 
free rein to set a meaning consistent with public policy goals—
Robertson and Omni command that service of process provisions 
be narrowly construed.128 Further, her interpretation has 
serious problems. Except for Rule 4(k)(1)(B), Rule 4(k)(1) does 
not deal in specifics; it delegates determination of when service 
is appropriate to state or federal statutes, suggesting we should 
look to them to determine the scope of a federal court’s process. 
Moreover, Simard’s interpretation would allow plaintiffs to 
bring claims unrelated to the anchor claim, thus obliterating the 
line between specific and general personal jurisdiction.129 
Because the Court has cautioned against blurring that line,130 
her interpretation is untenable. Rule 4(k)(1) does not authorize 
pendent personal jurisdiction.131   
 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Id. at 1647 (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 1). She also points to notes from the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. See id. at 1648. The notes that Simard points to, however, refer specifically to subject 
matter jurisdiction, as is made clear by the Committee’s citation to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.   
128. See Omni, 484 U.S. at 105–06 (“It would appear that Congress knows how to authorize 
nationwide service of process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do so here 
argues forcefully that such authorization was not its intention.”); Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 
268 U.S. 619, 624–27 (1925); supra note 112. Logically, the rule of strict construction should also 
apply to rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) (urging that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be 
narrowly construed to “minimize potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act” (quoting Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999))); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 
444–46 (1946) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be interpreted to 
expand the jurisdiction of federal courts). Indeed, historical evidence suggests that members of 
the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules were concerned about the rules usurping 
Congress’s power to define the scope of service of process. See Stephen Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1172 n.673 (1982) (discussing the anxieties of 
various constituencies).  
129. Professor Simard acknowledges this problem. See Simard, supra note 4, at 1646.  
130. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) 
(emphasizing that specific and general jurisdiction are “very different”).  
     131.   Although I have seen no published work suggest this, one of the individuals who 
helpfully commented on drafts of this Article asked whether Rule 18 could be understood to 
authorize pendent claim personal jurisdiction. Rule 18 allows plaintiffs to join multiple claims 
against a defendant. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules made clear that this rule, like the 
rules dealing with the joinder of parties, governs only pleading requirements, and does not 
address jurisdictional requirements. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18 advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment (stating that Rule 18 “does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdiction or 
venue which may arise with respect to claims properly joined as a matter of pleading”).  
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3. Specific federal statutes 
Finally, some scholars and courts have proposed that specific 
federal laws enable pendent claim personal jurisdiction.132 If a 
federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process 
allowed pendent claim personal jurisdiction, a federal court 
could exercise it without needing to rely on the long-arm statute 
of the state where it sits.133 Congress has only established 
nationwide service of process for federal claims in a limited 
number of statutes.134 Ultimately, this Article concludes that 
these various federal statutes (with one potential, limited 
exception) do not bless pendent claim personal jurisdiction as 
to claims that are related to the relevant federal claims referred 
to in the statutes.  
a. A representative example: the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
Section 27 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provides a 
representative example of the language contained in these 
provisions, so we start our analysis there. The provision states: 
 
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this chapter or rules and regulations 
thereunder . . . may be brought in any such 
district or in the district wherein the defendant is 
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, 
and process in such cases may be served in any 
other district of which the defendant is an 
 
132. See Cochran, supra note 4, at 1477; Heller, supra note 4, at 137; Mills, supra note 4, at 439–
40. This subsection does not focus on pendent party personal jurisdiction because a nationwide 
service of process provision makes it unnecessary to invoke that doctrine. Subject to any 
pertinent constitutional limitations under the Fifth Amendment, see infra note 176, personal 
jurisdiction rules do not bar anyone from bringing a direct purchaser claim under the Clayton 
Act anywhere in the United States because of the nationwide service of process provision. Thus, 
plaintiffs from around the country can, assuming any other requirements are met, join together 
their Clayton Act claims in any federal court.  
133. See Yonan, supra note 4, at 560 (stating that a statutory provision would allow a federal 
court to “circumvent” the long-arm statute limitation).  
134. See infra note 184.  
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inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be 
found.135 
 
Many applications of pendent claim personal jurisdiction have 
occurred under this provision.136 Analyzing this provision in 
Hargrave, the Second Circuit started by pointing to prior cases—
International Controls Corp. and Robinson—and then it justified 
how the courts in those cases embraced pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction under section 27.137 The court, as it did when 
analyzing sections 1331 and 1332, focused on the word 
“action.”138 Pointing to cases like Gibbs, where “action” was 
interpreted broadly to mean “the entire controversy,” the court 
decided that section 27 authorized pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction as to state-law claims related to the federal 
securities claim.139  
However, this conclusion is unsatisfactory. Take a closer look 
at the relevant sentence, which allows nationwide service of 
process for “[a]ny suit or action to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder.”140 The 
court focused on the word “action,” and then interpreted it 
broadly. But the sentence qualifies what type of “action” 
nationwide service of process is permitted for: the “action” is 
one to enforce a duty or liability “created by this chapter.”141 
Although it is possible to read “action” in its broadest Gibbs-
esque sense here, the more plausible reading is that nationwide 
service of process is conferred only for claims brought to 
enforce the provisions of the Act.142 Thus, section 27 does not 
 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018). 
136. See, e.g., Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); Robinson v. 
Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973). 
137. See 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980). In those cases, the courts did not attempt to 
articulate a statutory basis for their actions.  
138. See id. at 719–20. 
139. See id. 
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (emphasis added). 
141. Id.  
142. But see Cochran, supra note 4, at 1476 (making a similar Gibbs-centered argument for the 
Investment Company Act of 1940); Mills, supra note 4, at 439–40 (arguing that the statute should 
be read similarly to how the Gibbs Court interpreted “case” in Article III of the Constitution). 
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permit service of process for claims other than those created by 
the Act. Therefore, a court cannot exercise pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction through section 27.  
b. Interpreting service of process provisions  
This subsection takes a closer interpretive look at section 27, 
confronting the challenge of interpreting service of process 
provisions.  Scholars have devoted little attention to this 
challenge.  
Interpreting section 27 is complicated because of the 
confusing relationship between personal jurisdiction and 
service of process. Literally speaking, service of process is 
merely the means by which the court gives notice to a defendant 
that she is being sued.143 Traditionally, service of process has 
also served the function of asserting the court’s personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, which explains why Congress 
has authorized “service of process” when it wanted to allow 
federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction.144 Thus, statutes or 
rules regulating service of process serve two roles.145 First, they 
regulate the procedure, the means by which notice is given to a 
defendant.146 Second, they define the scope of process and, by 
extension, a court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction.147  
Still, service of process is not the same thing as personal 
jurisdiction, posing this question: does section 27’s delineated 
scope of service of process limit a federal court’s scope of 
personal jurisdiction under section 27? If so, then federal courts 
 
143. See HERMA KAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 414 (9th ed. 2013) (explaining that notice is 
“so often confused with personal jurisdiction because both are commonly dealt with under the 
single rubric of due process”); Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a ‘Substantive 
Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1203–04 (2000) 
(distinguishing between the “manner and method of service of process” and “amenability to 
jurisdiction”). 
144. See BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1556 (2017) (“Congress uses this terminology 
because, absent consent, a basis for service of a summons on the defendant is prerequisite to the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.”). 
145. See SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 255.  
146. See FED. R. CIV. P.  4(a)–(j), (l)–(n) (describing the contents, issuance, specifics of service, 
time limits, and jurisdiction over property and assets for a summons). 
147. See id. 4(k); see also SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 255.  
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cannot exercise pendent claim personal jurisdiction. This 
Article considers two interpretive approaches: textualism and 
purposivism.  
Textualists should conclude that “service of process” implies 
personal jurisdiction, so that statutory boundaries on service of 
process limit, by extension, personal jurisdiction. The rule of 
ordinary meaning, a textualist’s starting point,148 does little to 
elucidate the meaning of “service of process.”149 A more 
promising option is to treat “service of process” as a legal term 
of art that implies “personal jurisdiction.”150 Moreover, the 
textualist would investigate how the phrase “service of 
process” was historically used in an effort to describe an 
objective legislative intent.151  
The historical inquiry should lead a textualist to determine 
that section 27’s use of the phrase “service of process” was 
understood to delineate the bounds of personal jurisdiction, not 
just the means by which a party is informed of a lawsuit. 
Historically, when Congress has wished to authorize personal 
jurisdiction, it has used the term “service of process.” Starting 
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established service of 
process scope rules as separate constraints on assertions of 
jurisdiction by the lower federal courts.152 Throughout 
 
148. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the 
Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121, 136–37 (2016) (discussing 
the “signs” to be used when determining the meaning of words with the ordinary meaning of 
the word being the touchstone). 
149. See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1931) (applying the rule of ordinary 
meaning).  
150. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress 
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will 
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”); see also Felix Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947) (“[I]f a word is obviously 
transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings 
soil with it.”).  
151. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  
152. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (“And no civil suit shall be brought 
before [the lower federal courts] against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original 
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American history, courts referred to personal jurisdiction in 
terms of “service of process.”153 For example, in 1814, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court stated, “there must be not only a 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, but also a jurisdiction of 
the process.”154 Thus, it is unsurprising that, starting with the 
Clayton Act, all of the relevant nationwide service of process 
provisions featured the “service of process” language.155 Just 
nine years before Congress enacted section 27, the Supreme 
Court stated that personal jurisdiction “implies . . . service of 
process upon” the individual.156  
The foregoing allows textualists to identify an objective 
legislative intent in the “service of process” phraseology, 
concluding section 27 defines the scope of personal jurisdiction, 
not just the means by which a defendant is given notice. 
Moreover, today’s legal community still treats the terms 
 
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant.”); see also Ex Parte Graham, 
10 F. Cas. 911, 912 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (Washington, Circuit Justice) (stating that Congress “has 
not left this subject to implication” and that the Judiciary Act’s provisions on service of process 
“appear manifestly to circumscribe the jurisdiction” of the federal courts); G.W. Foster, Jr., 
Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 
47 F.R.D. 73, 79–80 (1968) (identifying the Judiciary Act’s regulation of personal jurisdiction 
through service of process terminology). Until 1938, absent a nationwide service of process 
provision in a federal statute, the Judiciary Act limited the scope of a federal district court’s 
process to the geographical territory of the judicial district that it sat in. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(f), adopted by the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act in 1938, expanded 
the scope of the district courts’ process to reach throughout the particular states they sat in. See 
Kelleher, supra note 143, at 1204–05 (explaining the historical development).  
153. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 608–09 (1990); Mech. Appliance 
Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437, 441–42, 446 (1910) (dismissing complaint for “want of 
jurisdiction” when process was served beyond the authorized scope (emphasis added)); 
Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 338–40 (1850) (“If the process be not sufficient to bring the 
defendant into court and make him a party to the decree, where all the other proceedings are 
regular, the case cannot be improved.”); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.Cas. 609, 616 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) 
(Story, Circuit Justice); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige Ch. 425, 430 (N.Y. Ch. 1834); Evans v. Instine, 7 
Ohio 273, 275 (1835); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 449 (Pa. 1844).  
154. Gruman v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 44 (1814).  
155. See infra note 184. In a recent proposed bill, Congress considered replacing the 
traditional “service of process” language with text instead defining the scope of “personal 
jurisdiction.” See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 1535, 113th Cong. § 5(e) (2004) 
(authorizing “personal jurisdiction” while not mentioning “service of process”). However, 
Congress deleted that language from the final version of the bill, substituting “service of 
process” in its place. Even if Congress is shifting away from its old “service of process” 
language, that does not change the original meaning of past provisions.  
156. See Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1925).  
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“service of process” and “personal jurisdiction” 
interchangeably.157 The Court’s controlling precedents 
recognize the distinction between the two concepts, yet strongly 
imply that the power to exercise personal jurisdiction 
necessarily depends on the authorization to issue process.158 
Thus, a conventionalist interpreter would reach the same result 
as a textualist focusing on original, objective legislative intent.159  
Having determined that the legal community historically 
used—and currently uses—”service of process” to imply 
“personal jurisdiction,” section 27 is not otherwise ambiguous: 
it allows nationwide service of process for “[a]ny suit or action 
to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and 
regulations thereunder.”160 Thus, textualists and conventionalists 
would conclude the provision only authorizes nationwide 
personal jurisdiction for federal courts as to claims created by 
the 1934 Exchange Act or SEC regulations promulgated 
thereunder, and not for related claims created by other sources. 
 
157. See, e.g., Ohio Civ. R. 4.1 (“Service of process may be made outside of this state, as 
provided in this rule, in any action in this state, upon a person who, at the time of service of 
process, is a nonresident of this state or is a resident of this state who is absent from this state.”); 
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[A]s a general rule, 
service of process is the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
. . . .”); KAY ET AL., supra note 143, at 414 (explaining that notice is “so often confused with 
personal jurisdiction because both are commonly dealt with under the single rubric of due 
process”); Rachel M. Janutis, Pulling Venue Up By Its Bootstraps: The Relationship Among 
Nationwide Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and § 1391(C), 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 37, 37–38 
(2004) (“Since a corporation subject to nationwide service of process is subject to nationwide 
personal jurisdiction . . . .”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f) (“[S]erving a summons or filing a 
waiver of service . . . is effective to establish personal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
158. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1555 (2017) (“Congress’ typical mode of 
providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction has been to authorize service of process.”); 
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (“[A] federal district court’s authority to assert 
personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of process on a defendant who is subject 
to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court 
is located.”); Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 102, 111 (1987) (“In 
summary, the District Court may not exercise jurisdiction . . . without authorization to serve 
process.”); United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965) (assuming the federal 
district court in New York had personal jurisdiction over an international defendant where 
New York’s long-arm statute authorized international service of process on all those who 
conducted business within the state). 
159. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 510–15 (1996) 
(defining the conventionalist approach to statutory interpretation).  
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, it does not make intuitive sense that Congress intended 
to permit personal jurisdiction beyond the scope of process it 
authorized for the district courts.161 Although there are policy 
arguments against this conclusion, a textualist approach deems 
such considerations irrelevant because federal courts have 
limited power and must be faithful to statutes passed by an 
elected legislature.162 Although judges might prefer a different 
public policy outcome, a textualist approach accepts that 
democratically accountable branches of government must 
make these choices.163  
Section 27’s meaning is a closer call for purposivist 
interpreters. Because service of process does not literally mean 
the same thing as personal jurisdiction, one could think that 
Congress did not reveal how much personal jurisdiction it 
wished to authorize in the statute. This conclusion would allow 
courts to determine how much personal jurisdiction is 
consistent with Congress’s purpose, and then to promulgate a 
federal common-law standard consistent with that purpose.164 
 
161. To clarify, this Article does not suggest the scope of authorized process and validly-
asserted personal jurisdiction are coextensive. Sometimes, service of process is allowed by 
statute but personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted for constitutional reasons. See SILBERMAN, 
STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 271–72. This Article does suggest that, in statutes using the 
“service of process” phraseology, the scope of service is the maximum scope of valid personal 
jurisdiction, a category which might be narrower than statutorily-authorized service for 
constitutional reasons. 
162. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 151, at 12–14 (arguing that courts play a limited role in 
making public policy within a representative system of government); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 47 (James Madison) (“Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and 
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the 
legislator.”) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
Hafner Pub. Co. N.Y. 1949)). Conventionalists would approach the issue similarly. See Merrill, 
supra note 159, at 513 (“Thus, like originalism, conventionalism posits that the role of the 
interpreter is to find the meaning of the contested textual provision . . . . not to make it up.”). 
163. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive 
Process, an Institutionalist Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 762–64 (1989) (“[A] fundamentally 
democratic society assumes as its ultimate normative political premise some notion of self-
determination . . . . Thus a representational democratic system will measure the legitimacy of 
governmental decisionmaking . . . not by objective examination of the wisdom of the decision, 
but rather by determining how consistent the processes used to reach that decision are with the 
notion of self-determination.”).  
164. This approach was suggested to me by Professor Stephen Burbank. See also HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (encouraging 
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Under this approach, the federal courts could infer authority to 
exercise personal jurisdiction as to claims for which section 27 
does not authorize service of process.  
Seeking a meaning consistent with the congressional 
purposes behind section 27 will likely produce two alternative, 
constructive answers. The provision’s narrower purpose is to 
ensure that federal courts are not inhibited from adjudicating 
claims under the Act because of traditional jurisdictional 
barriers.165 This purpose does not support pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction as to the related claims, because claims 
under the Act can be brought without it. An alternative, broader 
constructive purpose behind section 27 is to encourage 
plaintiffs to bring claims under the Act in federal court. Further, 
one can argue that allowing pendent claim personal jurisdiction 
advances this purpose because, without it, forcing a plaintiff to 
occasionally bring her state-law claims separately would 
discourage that plaintiff from bringing her claim under the Act 
in federal court. Additionally, section 27 grants federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to claims arising under the 
Act. This means that if section 27 does not permit pendent 
 
judges to use tools of construction to determine “what purpose ought to be attributed to the 
statute” to “carry out [Congress’s] purpose as best it can”). Although this section discusses 
“interpretation,” the line between statutory interpretation, construction, and the promulgation 
of federal common law can become blurry. Outside certain substantive areas of uniquely federal 
concern, like the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements under the Lincoln Mills 
doctrine, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), even strong defenders 
of federal common law acknowledge it must be tethered to a source of written law. See, e.g., 
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 
70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 759 (1985) (stating that the Rules of Decisions Act requires a federal 
judge to justify federal common law with reference to a constitutional or statutory source that 
either “expressly” requires its creation or “implicitly and plausibly call[s] for” it); Martha A. 
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 927–30 (1986) 
(“[T]he primary limit on power to make federal common law is that there must be a source of 
authority for any given federal common law rule.”). In federal common-law terms, this 
subsection argues that the constructive purposes behind section 27 should not lead one to favor 
promulgating a federal common law of pendent personal jurisdiction.  
165. See Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the 
Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (1984) (“Although the legislative history of the 
securities laws is silent as to the government interests furthered by nationwide personal 
jurisdiction, one can easily assume that Congress believed that allowing investors to litigate 
securities fraud issues anywhere in the nation was a beneficial approach to policing the stock 
market . . . .”). I found no relevant legislative history when searching through the Act’s 
congressional record.  
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personal jurisdiction, there will be some cases where the 
plaintiff must bring her federal and state-law claims separately. 
Even without embracing a broad interpretation, however, 
plaintiffs will usually be able to bring all claims together in a 
federal court within the state where the court can adjudicate the 
state-law claims under the state’s long-arm statute, mitigating 
the problem of exclusive jurisdiction.     
Precedent suggests that the purposivist judge should 
embrace the narrower purpose and thus not discover pendent 
personal jurisdiction within section 27. Deliberating in light of 
Congress’s record of defining limits on the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts through service of process,166 the Supreme Court 
has instructed federal courts not to expand the scope of their 
service of process by promulgating common law.167 In Omni, the 
Court considered the question of whether federal courts could 
exercise a federal common-law power to allow nationwide 
service of process under the Commodity Exchange Act, which 
did not have a nationwide service of process provision.168 The 
Court held that it was not appropriate to imply such a 
provision.169 The Court noted that Congress knows how to 
authorize nationwide service of process, stating that its failure 
to do so speaks forcefully against the idea that it intended to do 
so.170 The Court’s language resembles a clear statement rule. At 
the very least, it suggests that nationwide service of process 
statutes should be interpreted narrowly.171 
 
166. For another example, at a 1924 congressional hearing, Justice Willis Van Devanter 
testified that the Court had “always dealt with” out-of-state service of process “as a question to 
be regulated by Congress or by statutes.” See Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and 
S. 2061 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 68th Cong. 62 (1924).  
167. But see Heller, supra note 4, at 131–37 (“[I]t is appropriate to read nationwide service of 
process statutes as authorizing pendent process, because pendent process furthers the purposes 
for which these statutes were enacted.”). 
168. See 484 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1987).  
169. See id. 
170. See id. at 106.  
171. See SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 180 (interpreting Omni to hold that 
“federal courts must have explicit authorization in a statute or federal rule in order to effect 
service beyond state lines”); supra note 112.  
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But unlike the statute in Omni, section 27 does have a 
nationwide service of process provision. But the same 
rationales justifying application of Omni’s interpretive rules to 
whether a nationwide service of process statute exists should 
also apply to measuring an existing provision’s scope. Congress 
could have chosen language making it clear that process was 
also authorized for related claims.172 Congress has authorized 
nationwide service of process for state-law claims in other 
situations.173 But it did not do so in section 27. Under Omni’s 
logic, the fact that Congress did not use broader language in 
section 27 counsels against a broad interpretation.174   
Further, public policy considerations point in both directions 
and do not provide a compelling reason to depart from the 
Court’s precedent and the statute’s natural reading. Although 
 
172.  Congress arguably did that with the Federal Arbitration Act, which authorizes 
nationwide service of process by a federal court to enforce an arbitration award. When the 
statute is triggered, “the court shall have jurisdiction of [the served] party as though he had 
appeared generally in the proceeding.” 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2018). If one is persuaded this provision 
allows pendent personal jurisdiction, then it is an exception to the analysis that follows. 
173.  It has done so twice. See SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 181. First, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 
authorizes nationwide service for claims brought under the federal interpleader statute. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2361 (2018). Second, the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act permits 
nationwide service of process in cases involving mass accidents that kill at least seventy-five 
people. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2018).  
174. See, e.g., Knight v. Comm’r., 552 U.S. 181, 188 (2008) (citing Congress’s decision not to 
adopt “apparent alternative” language to support a statutory reading).  The most significant 
precedent pointing the other way is Gibbs. In Gibbs, the Court cited public policy reasons to 
recognize pendent claim subject matter jurisdiction, and it neglected to cite the governing 
statutory provisions. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (citing 
justifications of “judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants”). There is tension 
between Gibbs and the Court’s tradition of paying careful attention to Congress’s statutory 
authorization of jurisdiction. See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 866–67. Indeed, scholars 
recognized that the Court repudiated much of the rationale underlying Gibbs in Finley v. United 
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: 
The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 157 (1999) (“Finley brought to a close 
the free-wheeling jurisdictional days of Gibbs and inaugurated an era of close attention to 
statutory text.”). This Article will not address whether Gibbs was correct, because it does not 
undercut my argument. Whereas section 27’s language cannot be fairly read to authorize 
pendent personal jurisdiction, one can justify Gibbs’s holding under the statutory language in 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows subject matter jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Even if not the most natural reading, the 
term “civil action” can be understood to be coextensive with Article III’s “case.” To the extent 
there is tension between Gibbs and my argument, this Article privileges Robertson and Omni, the 
governing cases.  
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pendent claim personal jurisdiction helps plaintiffs, honoring 
the principle that the plaintiff is the “master of his forum,”175 it 
threatens defendants’ interests. Although a purposivist may 
dislike the occasional situation where a plaintiff must litigate 
federal and state claims separately, a broad reading would 
greatly expand plaintiffs’ forum shopping options. It would 
allow a plaintiff to bring state-law claims in any federal court 
across the country if she can articulate a related claim under a 
federal law with a nationwide service of process provision. 
Further, the Fifth Amendment—the constitutional check on 
nationwide service of process—offers defendants little 
protection against extreme forum shopping.176 Similarly, venue 
provisions will often not protect defendants in these cases.177  
Defendants aside, it is questionable whether reading section 
27 to enable pendent personal jurisdiction would promote good 
policy. Although it seems attractive to resolve a plaintiff’s 
claims in one judicial proceeding, a broad reading does little to 
facilitate efficiency, as plaintiffs ordinarily can have their claims 
resolved in one judicial proceeding without pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction, even in cases involving exclusive federal 
 
175. See, e.g., Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on 
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 301 (1996) (quoting and referencing George D. Brown, The 
Ideology of Forum Shopping—Why Doesn’t a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 
649, 669 (1993)). 
176. Courts are currently split on whether the Fifth Amendment provides any limits on 
assertions of personal jurisdiction within the United States. Compare Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 
527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)  (“[D]ue process requires only certain minimum contacts 
between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. The issue is not whether it 
is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient  
forum . . . . The cases before us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts 
of the United States. No due process problem exists.”), and Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 
333 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that jurisdiction within the United States does not implicate a Fifth 
Amendment fairness concern), with DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (suggesting that extreme inconvenience to a defendant may violate due 
process even if it has significant contacts with the United States). Any limits are likely minimal 
and would offer little protection. But see Fullerton, supra note 165, at 16–22 (arguing for more 
robust limits on personal jurisdiction within the United States under the Fifth Amendment).  
177. See Janutis, supra note 157, at 37 (observing that federal courts have interpreted 
nationwide service of process provisions to allow for nationwide venue); Fullerton, supra note 
165, at 62–63 (observing that venue protections often do not protect against unreasonable 
applications of nationwide service of process provisions).  
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jurisdiction.178 Moreover, federal courts are not best equipped 
to resolve state-law issues unconnected with the state they sit 
in.179 Relatedly, the local community that the federal court sits 
in would likely have little interest in expending resources to 
adjudicate controversies utterly unconnected with it.180 Further, 
beyond the parties’ interests, a narrow reading promotes 
comity with the state courts, who have an interest in 
adjudicating cases connected to them.181 Finally, allowing lower 
federal courts—whose authority is defined by Congress—to 
expand the scope of their process threatens the separation of 
powers.182 Because Congress has the authority to define the 
federal courts’ personal jurisdiction, it would be an usurpation 
of that authority for the federal courts to expand it sua sponte.183 
 
178. Ordinarily, plaintiffs could bring their federal and state-law claims in a federal court 
sitting within the state that the state-law claims are connected to or in a state where the 
defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction.  
179. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (noting that letting state courts decide state-law questions 
“promote[s] justice between the parties [] by procuring for them a surer-footed reading” of state 
law); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal 
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1774 (1992) (“[A] 
court’s level of expertise in and familiarity with a sovereign’s body of law will be in direct 
proportion to the amount of time it devotes to interpretation of that law.”).   
180. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (“Jury duty is a burden that 
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the 
litigation.”). 
181. See, e.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (“Needless decisions of state law [by federal courts] 
should be avoided as [] a matter of comity . . . .”).  
182. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Courts created by statute can 
have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)  
8, 9 n.1 (1799) (“The political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few 
specified instances) belongs to congress . . . . [and] Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, 
be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts to every subject, in every form, 
which the Constitution might warrant.”); see also Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 
U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (“[T]he federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial 
branch, of government.”). 
183. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109 (1987) (“It seems 
likely that Congress has been acting on the assumption that federal courts cannot add to the 
scope of service of summons Congress has authorized.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985) (describing separation of 
powers considerations “as the dominant ground for questioning lawmaking by federal courts”); 
cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1027, 1054 (2002) (identifying federal judges’ “perfectly natural desires to maximize their 
own power and to serve their own institutional interests,” but arguing in the interjurisdictional 
preclusion context that they should “not be given free rein to define and pursue that interest”). 
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In short, section 27 should not be read to authorize pendent 
personal jurisdiction. For textualists, it seems like an easy call. 
For purposivists, the question is closer, but precedent and 
public policy favor the more natural reading. This argument 
calls into question the precedents that have relied on section 
27’s service of process provisions to adjudicate state-law claims.  
c. Other nationwide service of process provisions  
The analysis of the preceding subsection reaches beyond the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act. It should apply with equal force 
to the Clayton Act, Investment Company Act, the RICO Act, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and several other 
statutes with similar language.184 Consistent with the preceding 
 
184. The language authorizing nationwide service of process is similar in all relevant 
statutes. I italicize the limiting language in each one. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2018) (“Any 
suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only 
in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found 
or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an 
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.”); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
43 (2018) (“Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation 
of, this subchapter or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such district or 
in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such 
cases may be served in any district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business 
or wherever the defendant may be found.”); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965d (2018) (“All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter 
may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has 
an agent, or transacts his affairs.”); Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2334 
(2018) (“Any civil action under section 2333 of this title against any person may be instituted in 
the district court of the United States for any district where any plaintiff resides or where any 
defendant resides or is served, or has an agent. Process in such a civil action may be served in 
any district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent.”); Mandamus and Venue 
Statute of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2018) (“A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or 
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color 
of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as 
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the 
action resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, 
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) the plaintiff 
resides if no real property is involved in the action . . . . The summons and complaint in such an 
action [may] be served . . . by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which 
the action is brought.”); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1451(d) (2018) 
(“An action under this section may be brought in the district where the plan is administered or 
where a defendant resides or does business, and process may be served in any district where a 
defendant resides, does business, or may be found.”); Patent Codification Act, 35 U.S.C. § 293 
(2018) (“Every patentee not residing in the United States may file in the Patent and Trademark 
Office a written designation stating the name and address of a person residing within the 
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discussion, the nationwide service of process provisions in 
these statutes should not be read to allow pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction.  
In summary, the subject matter jurisdiction statutes, Rule 4, 
and the cited federal nationwide service of process provisions 
do not authorize pendent claim personal jurisdiction. However, 
accepting my argument does not yet doom pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction. If a federal court cannot rely on a federal 
statute to authorize its personal jurisdiction, it can rely on the 
long-arm statute of the state in which it sits.      
B. State Long-Arm Statutes 
The federal courts, at least in some states, could attempt to 
rely on state long-arm statutes to exercise pendent claim and 
party personal jurisdiction. The United States has a federalist 
system of personal jurisdiction for the federal courts, often 
forcing them to rely on state law to assert it, even as to federal 
claims.185 Historically speaking, this situation is best 
understood as the inheritance of a long history and tradition of 
personal jurisdiction based on the territorial boundaries of the 
state courts.186 Today, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) designates state long-arm 
statutes as the primary source of authority for federal court 
 
United States on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting the patent or 
rights thereunder.”). 
185. See, e.g., Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 422–23 (5th Cir. 
1986) (“It may seem anomalous to tie personal jurisdiction in a federal question case to the long-
arm statute of the state in which the federal court sits . . . . A heavy weight of authority, however, 
accepts the anomaly.”).  
    186.  See Omni, 484 U.S. at 109 (explaining how the history of territory-based personal 
jurisdiction has influenced the modern doctrine); Foster, Jr., supra note 152, at 79–80 (“These 
restrictions represented a policy choice that reflected the prevailing [eighteenth c]entury 
procedural practices and, perhaps to some extent, the larger compromise which led to the 
establishment of a system of federal trial courts exercising a jurisdiction largely concurrent with 
that of the state courts.”). It is not my current project to analyze whether, as a matter of policy, 
the status quo make sense. Other scholars have recently addressed this question. See, e.g., 
Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301 (2014) 
(proposing legislation establishing nationwide personal jurisdiction for the federal courts and 
suggesting we rely on venue rules to limit where lawsuits may be brought). 
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assertions of personal jurisdiction.187 Since there is no federal 
law authorizing pendent claim or party personal jurisdiction, 
we must ask if state law authorizes it for the federal courts.  
No state long-arm statute explicitly authorizes either pendent 
claim or party personal jurisdiction. However, states often 
formulate these statutes to allow the maximum amount of 
personal jurisdiction that is consistent with the Constitution 
(“full-extent statutes”).188 As of 2004, thirty-two states had 
adopted full-extent statutes either by their terms or judicial 
construction.189 Because there is no other federal source of 
authority for pendent claim or party personal jurisdiction, 
federal courts in the states that have not adopted full-extent 
statutes need to articulate a source of authority under state law 
for pendent personal jurisdiction before doing so. This will 
require federal courts in those states to look at the particular 
long-arm statute and precedents of the state in which they sit.190 
For federal courts sitting in states that do have long-arm 
statutes authorizing pendent personal jurisdiction, the next 
question is whether exercising that jurisdiction is consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it may seem odd 
that the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment, 
limits federal court assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction, 
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the state laws that federal 
courts must rely on. Indeed, this analytical framework is well 
 
187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 272, 283 (2014) (“Federal courts 
ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” 
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014))). Although Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is widely 
understood to apply when a federal district court exercises diversity and federal question 
jurisdiction (absent a nationwide service process provision), some think it should not. Professor 
Kelleher argues that Rule 4(k)(1)(A) violates the Rules Enabling Act by governing the scope of 
the district courts’ service of process, and not merely the manner of it. See Kelleher, supra note 
143, at 1209–14. Professor Kelleher, moreover, asserts that the scope of a federal court’s service 
of process in diversity cases is governed by statute, as she interprets the Rules of Decision Act 
to require federal courts to rely on state long-arm statutes in diversity cases. See id. at 1211–12; 
see also Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 711–12 (1982) 
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (articulating the same view of the Rules of Decision Act).  
188. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the 
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 492–99 (2004) (documenting the trend). 
189. For a list, see id. at 525–31.  
190. Some state courts have already concluded that pendent claim personal jurisdiction is 
invalid under state law. See supra note 5.  
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established by the Supreme Court.191 Consequently, although a 
bit constitutionally quirky, the Fourteenth Amendment 
currently limits federal court assertions of pendent claim and 
party personal jurisdiction 
C. Implications 
State long-arm statutes are the only possible source of 
authority for a federal court’s assertion of pendent claim or 
party personal jurisdiction. Two important implications follow 
from this conclusion. First, courts and scholars have sometimes 
drawn a conceptual line between pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction in the “nationwide service of process cases” and its 
application in other cases.192 Indeed, almost all circuits have 
embraced it in nationwide service of process cases, whereas far 
fewer courts have done so beyond that.193 But there is no 
meaningful distinction between these different contexts 
because those statutes do not authorize pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction. All current applications of pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction depend on the same source of authority: the state 
long-arm statutes. Although Congress could authorize pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction in a federal statute, it has not done 
so. It does not make sense to accept the legitimacy of pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction in the nationwide service of process 
context but reject it in other contexts.  
 Second, federal assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction 
can only be legitimate in states that have authorized it. 
Although no state long-arm statute explicitly authorizes 
 
191. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 283–91 (analyzing Nevada federal court’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment); Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 125–29 (detailing the 
analytical framework when a federal court asserts personal jurisdiction under state law); see also 
Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017) (“As a procedural matter, federal courts 
look to state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over a party. The Illinois long-
arm statute permits the court to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the state statutory and federal 
constitutional requirements merge.”); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 
2017); Borchers, supra note 2, at 443.  
192. See supra note 14.  
193. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.  
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pendent personal jurisdiction, some states have “full-extent 
statutes,” meaning a federal court can exercise pendent 
personal jurisdiction in those states as long as it is consistent with 
the Constitution, a question I take up below. In the states 
without full-extent long-arm statutes, the federal courts cannot 
authorize pendent personal jurisdiction unless they cite a state-
law source of authority.  
III. THE RELATEDNESS ELEMENT, BRISTOL-MYERS, AND 
INTERSTATE FEDERALISM 
This Article ultimately argues that pendent personal 
jurisdiction must fall under specific personal jurisdiction’s 
Fourteenth Amendment relatedness element, as it is defined in 
Bristol-Myers. As discussed in Section II.B, pendent personal 
jurisdiction in the federal courts will usually be evaluated 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, as the federal courts 
generally rely on state law to maintain personal jurisdiction. 
Thus, it is important to introduce the relatedness element. In 
short, the relatedness element reflects a historical commitment 
to interstate federalism by balancing among the competing 
sovereigns within the United States.   
A. Personal Jurisdiction’s Relatedness Element 
In 1945, the Court ushered in the modern era of personal 
jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,194 which 
upheld out-of-state service of process in a large set of cases 
implicating what would eventually come to be called specific 
personal jurisdiction.195 International Shoe’s language sets 
modest limitations on assertions of specific personal 
jurisdiction by the states. The defendant must merely have 
“certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 
 
194. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
195. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (introducing the terms “specific” and “general” 
personal jurisdiction). 
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fair play and substantial justice.’”196 But not just any minimum 
contacts suffice. As the Court explained, “the casual presence of 
the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated 
items of activities in a state on the corporation’s behalf are not 
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with 
the activities there.”197 This birthed the relatedness element: a 
defendant is only subject to jurisdiction in a forum state if it had 
contacts related to the claim there. Although the Court has 
established additional requirements for specific personal 
jurisdiction since International Shoe, this Article focuses on the 
relatedness element. 
Until recently, the Court paid little attention to specific 
personal jurisdiction’s relatedness element,198 allowing the 
lower courts to develop a wide variety of tests.199 In part, 
International Shoe enabled this diversity because it used three 
different phrases to describe the relatedness element: “related 
to,” “connected with,” and “arising from.”200 The “arising from” 
language, although itself elastic, is noticeably narrower than 
“related to.”201 An “arising from or related to” element would 
thus require a looser relationship between the claim and the 
forum state for specific personal jurisdiction than would an 
“arising from” standard.202  
 
196. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
197. See id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
198. In Helicopteros, the Court flagged the question but declined to address it. See 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984). Dissenting, Justice 
Brennan advocated for a broad definition, favoring easy availability of specific personal 
jurisdiction. See id. at 427 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be 
applicable whenever the cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts between 
the defendant and the forum.”).   
199. See, e.g., Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1078 (10th Cir. 
2008) (describing three different approaches courts have adopted). See generally SILBERMAN, 
STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 89; Borchers, supra note 2, at 434–35.  
200. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318–20 (using all three terms); see also Borchers, supra note 
2, at 433 (identifying the problem and labeling the three terms as “synonyms”).  
201. In Helicopteros, the majority suggested a claim could satisfy one standard but not the 
other, though it did not define the difference between them. 466 U.S. at 415 n.10; accord Lea 
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 737 (1988) (identifying 
the problem). 
202. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 
126 (making this observation).   
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Working with these different phrases, courts have developed 
a spectrum of approaches. On the spectrum’s more demanding 
end, the First and Eighth Circuits established a “proximate 
cause” standard, holding that the defendant’s forum-state 
contacts must be an “important, or perhaps even a material 
element of proof” in the plaintiff’s case.203 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit has embraced a looser “but for” standard, deeming the 
“relatedness” element satisfied if the plaintiff’s claim would not 
have arisen “but for” the defendant’s forum-state contacts.204 
On the spectrum’s least demanding end stands the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cornelison v. Chaney.205 After the 
defendant’s employee, a truck driver, hit the plaintiff’s 
decedent in Nevada, the plaintiff brought suit in California.206 
The court concluded that the Nevada accident, together with 
the defendant’s other California trucking operations, created a 
sufficient relationship between the claim and California, 
stating: “The accident arose out of the driving of the truck, the 
very activity which was the essential basis of defendant’s 
contacts with this state. These factors demonstrate, in our view, 
a substantial nexus between plaintiff’s cause of action and 
defendant’s activities in California.”207 Cornelison’s relatedness 
standard is loose; the defendant’s forum contacts do not even 
need to be a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury. Other courts 
have staked middle positions.208  
In 2017, the Court finally confronted the meaning of the 
relatedness element in Bristol-Myers.209 The case featured a mass 
 
203. See Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Hahn v. Vermont 
Law School, 698 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1983)); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 
1068–69 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Borchers, supra note 2, at 434–35. 
204. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 
U.S. 585 (1991).  
205. 16 Cal. 3d 143 (1976); see also Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations 
on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 83–84 (analyzing the case and evaluating 
varying degrees of relatedness between the defendant’s contacts and a claim). 
206. See Cornelison, 16 Cal. 3d at 146. 
207. See id.  
208. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007) (adopting a but-
for test “hew[ing] closely to the reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdiction rests”). 
209. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
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action against the pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (BMS) for alleged defects in Plavix, its well-known 
blood thinner drug. The plaintiffs—Plavix consumers from 
thirty-four states—attempted to join with each other against 
BMS in a California state court.210 BMS defended itself by 
arguing the California court only had personal jurisdiction over 
it as to the California plaintiffs’ claims, and not as to claims 
brought by out-of-state plaintiffs who had neither purchased 
nor consumed Plavix in California.211  
One is tempted to ask, “What’s wrong with California?”212 
BMS had plenty of contacts in California: it employed 
thousands of people and sold billions of dollars’ worth of Plavix 
there.213 Litigating the out-of-state claims in California also did 
not seem unreasonable, since BMS was already being forced to 
litigate the California claims there, and San Francisco was more 
convenient for BMS than the various state courts the out-of-
state plaintiffs would otherwise have to file in.214 In short, BMS’s 
only real argument was that the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims 
did not “arise from” its contacts with California. 
After the plaintiffs won at trial and before the intermediate 
appellate court, the California Supreme Court agreed that 
specific personal jurisdiction existed as to the out-of-state 
claims.215 Concluding that BMS had purposefully availed itself 
of California, the justices confronted the question of how related 
a claim must be to the defendant’s California contacts.216 They 
adopted a “sliding scale approach,” under which “the more 
 
210. The plaintiffs were able to avoid removal to federal court under the Class Action 
Fairness Act. See Andrew Bradt & Theodore D. Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-
Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1268 (2018). 
211. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
212. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 210, at 1253.  
213. See id.  
214. During oral arguments, Justice Kennedy made this point. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 4, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 
16-466).  
215. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783 (2016). The court also 
concluded that general personal jurisdiction did not exist. Id. at 883–84 (noting that BMS was 
not “at home” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler).  
216. See id. at 801–02.  
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wide-ranging a defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is 
shown a connection between the forum contacts and the 
claim.”217 Applying its test, the court held that because  
 
Bristol-Myers’ contacts with California are 
substantial and the company had enjoyed 
sizeable revenues from the sales of its product 
here—the very product that is the subject of all of 
the claims of the plaintiffs . . . Bristol-Myers’ 
extensive contacts with California establish 
minimum contacts based on a less direct 
connection between Bristol-Myers’ forum 
activities and plaintiffs’ claims than might 
otherwise be required.218 
 
The court also decided that jurisdiction was reasonable and that 
exercising jurisdiction would advance judicial efficiency.219 
The Supreme Court decisively rejected this sliding scale 
approach, though it provided limited clarity on the relatedness 
element. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito stated that 
California’s approach would blur the line between specific and 
general personal jurisdiction.220 As for the relatedness element, 
Justice Alito noted, “What is needed—and what is missing 
here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims 
at issue.”221 In other words, the plaintiffs needed some 
connection between their claims and the forum state. 
Apparently, the similarity between the California claims and 
the out-of-state claims did not qualify as some connection to 
California.222 At the same time, the Court did not take up BMS’s 
 
217. See id. at 802. 
218. See id. at 806.  
219. See id. at 808–13. 
220. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(explaining that California’s approach “resembles a loose and spurious form of general 
jurisdiction”). 
221. See id. 
222. Contra Cornelison, 16 Cal. 3d at 149.  
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suggested “proximate cause” test for relatedness, fostering 
continued uncertainty about the relatedness element.223  
Combined with the Court’s tightening of general personal 
jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman,224 Bristol-Myers will make 
nationwide mass and class actions more difficult to aggregate, 
particularly in cases involving multiple defendants 
headquartered in different states.225 After Daimler, scholars 
proposed work-arounds. One suggestion focused on expanding 
general personal jurisdiction by relying on state statutes 
deeming consent to jurisdiction by corporations doing business 
within the state,226 though several courts and scholars agree this 
proposal rests on dubious constitutional grounds.227 Another 
suggestion is the concept of pendent personal jurisdiction, 
which the Bristol-Myers’ plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried out in 
the California appellate court.228 Although they failed, litigants 
in dozens of recent cases are invoking pendent party personal 
jurisdiction, especially in nationwide class actions. If successful, 
they can effectively shield class actions from the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction cases.  
 
223. See Brief for Petitioner at 37–46, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 
S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466).  
224. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). There, the Court held that a defendant corporation is usually only 
subject to general personal jurisdiction in its state of incorporation and where its principal place 
of business is. Id. at 137.   
225. Some courts are resisting this interpretation of Bristol-Myers, though this Article argues 
that resistance is improper. See infra notes 257-89 and accompanying text.     
226. See, e.g., Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 4, at 258–63. 
227. See, e.g., Famular v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 CV 944 (VB), 2017 WL 2470844, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 7, 2017) (interpreting the Court’s decision in Daimler to invalidate consent statutes as a 
basis for general personal jurisdiction); Brilmayer et al., supra note 201, at 757 (“The most 
formidable constitutional issue surrounding general jurisdiction by consent arises when 
consent derives from a statutorily required appointment.”). But see Verity Winship, Jurisdiction 
over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1185–
86 (acknowledging that “[w]ith few exceptions . . . the implied consent statutes have been used 
without challenge as the basis for jurisdiction in most of Delaware’s corporate governance cases 
ever since Delaware declared them constitutional in 1980”).  
228. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 439 (2014). 
Professors Rhodes and Robertson, supra note 4, at 243–52, make the suggestion.   
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B. The Resurgence of Interstate Federalism 
Bristol-Myers requires “a connection between the forum and 
the specific claims at issue”229 for personal jurisdiction. To 
understand what this rule means for pendent personal 
jurisdiction, this Article examines the reason it exists: interstate 
federalism.  
The Court has had an on-and-off relationship with interstate 
federalism in its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,230 Justice White justified the 
Court’s decision to reject Oklahoma’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction because it was inconvenient to the defendant and 
violated interstate federalism principles.231 As to interstate 
federalism, the Court explained: 
 
we have never accepted the proposition that state 
lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor 
could we, and remain faithful to the principles of 
interstate federalism embodied in the 
Constitution . . . . the Framers also intended that 
the States retain many essential attributes of 
sovereignty, including, in particular, the 
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The 
sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a 
limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister 
States—a limitation express or implicit in both the 
original scheme of the Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.232 
 
 
229. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
230. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
231. See id. at 291–92 (“The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform 
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of 
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their 
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal 
sovereigns in a federal system.”).  
232. Id. at 292. 
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Justice White, however, explicitly repudiated this passage in 
Bauxites, suggesting interstate federalism did not operate “as an 
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court.”233 
As he explained it, the source of authority for the World-Wide 
Volkswagen rule is the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects 
individual liberty while making “no mention of federalism 
concerns.”234 Yet in Bristol-Myers, the Court stridently 
reembraced interstate federalism. Indeed, the Court quoted the 
very passage from World-Wide Volkswagen that Justice White 
had denounced as erroneous in Bauxites.235 Moreover, Justice 
Alito gave a full-throated defense of interstate federalism’s role 
in personal jurisdiction.  
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor asked a good question: 
“What interest could any single State have in adjudicating 
respondents’ claims that the other states do not share?”236  
Justice Alito’s opinion answered by noting that personal 
jurisdiction “encompasses the more abstract matter of 
submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little 
legitimate interest in the claims in question.”237 In other words, 
some states have an interest in adjudicating claims, and others 
either have no interest or too weak an interest. This language 
suggests the states may compete to assert jurisdiction.238 But 
states cannot always assert jurisdiction when they want to. As 
Justice Alito noted, “The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] 
a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States.”239 Thus, 
 
233. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). 
234. Id.  
235. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen for the proposition 
that interstate federalism limits assertions of personal jurisdiction and stating it “may be 
decisive”).  
236. See id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
237. See id. at 1780 (emphasis added). 
238. See also Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of 
the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT. & COMP. L. 111, 113 (1999) (arguing that the linkage between state 
law on jurisdiction and federal constitutional law may “encourage a race to the bottom, as state 
lawmakers consider either the interests of their residents or the interests of their lawyers in 
securing access to a local forum and do not want to suffer comparative disadvantage”). 
239. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).  
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although an isolated state may have the sovereign power to 
adjudicate claims with no connection to it, that power is limited 
by the sovereignty of other states, which also have interests in 
adjudicating claims. Applied to the case’s facts, Justice Alito’s 
logic meant that states other than California had an interest in 
adjudicating the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims. The Court’s rule 
therefore reserved adjudicatory power to them. 
C. What Role Does Interstate Federalism Play in Personal 
Jurisdiction? 
Scholars may wince at its resurgence,240 but interstate 
federalism is the driving force behind the Court’s decision in 
Bristol-Myers.241 But why? At first glance, it makes little sense. 
What does interstate federalism have to do with an individual’s 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest? Like many traditions, 
personal jurisdiction does not make perfect sense if summoned 
to the altar of modern reason.242 We must examine the history.  
In our ongoing dispute between Capias and RespondendCo, 
imagine instead that Capias traveled to Paraguay and sued 
RespondendCo there, and that Paraguay’s courts cooperated 
and issued the judgment. If Capias tried to enforce the 
 
240. Interstate federalism’s role in personal jurisdiction is deeply contested, with most 
scholars arguing it should not be relevant. See, e.g., Robert R. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward 
a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 83–86 
(1984) (arguing that the focus on state sovereignty in personal jurisdiction promotes wasteful 
litigation and does not make theoretical sense); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1057–58 (1983) (arguing that interstate federalism is not 
relevant to personal jurisdiction and that state sovereignty will not be harmed by eliminating 
its consideration); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A 
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1137 (1981); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process 
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 503 
(1984). But see James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Personal Jurisdiction, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 169 (2004) (arguing that personal jurisdiction rules should account for interstate 
federalism). 
241. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–29, 37–38, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466) (featuring invocations of interstate 
federalism in personal jurisdiction by Justices Gorsuch, Kagan, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer). 
242. Cf. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 8 (1991) 
(criticizing those who aggressively bring society’s “political, legal, and institutional 
inheritance” before “the tribunal of intellect”). 
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judgment in an American court, the effort would almost 
certainly fail under standard international law principles.243 The 
basic idea is that Paraguay would be overreaching, and that the 
United States’ own sovereignty would entitle it to enforce limits 
on Paraguay’s.244  
A similar scenario commonly played out in early American 
history. The states were once independent sovereigns. 
Although the Constitution tore down some lines between the 
states and eliminated some of their powers, the states retained 
essential elements of sovereignty, including their equality to 
each other.245 Thus, the states were, in some ways, foreign to one 
another, including in the recognition of judgments.246 If sued 
out-of-state, defendants would frequently just default, leaving 
the plaintiff attempting to enforce the judgment in the 
defendant’s home state.247 In those situations, state courts drew 
on traditional rules of international recognition in deciding 
whether to enforce another state’s judgment.248 The most 
important rule was that a judgment was not valid unless the 
defendant was served with process within the issuing state’s 
territory. Out-of-state service was seen as overreach. A state 
could purport to do it, but other states would not be forced to 
recognize an ensuing judgment.249 
 
243. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 2014) (“A 
court in the United States will not recognize a judgment of a court of a foreign state if . . . . the 
court that rendered the judgment did not have personal jurisdiction over the party resisting 
recognition . . . .”).   
244. See id. § 400 (“States have the right to preserve their sovereignty. Accordingly, they 
validly may resist recognition and enforcement if they view a foreign judgment as the product 
of deficiencies or significant differences in the law or procedure of the foreign forum.”).   
245. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (“Each state stands on the same level with 
all the rest.”); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild 
learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the 
[f]ederal [g]overnment.”).  
246. See Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1273 (2017) (“Early 
American states stood in much the same way as foreign nations.”).  
247. See id. at 1271 (noting that “[i]n the early Republic, jurisdiction was frequently raised at 
the recognition stage” of litigation once a party tried to enforce a judgment already won). 
248. See id. at 1273–78 (documenting historical practice and acknowledging ambiguity on 
the source of these rules).  
249. See id. at 1281–82.  
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Moreover, the Supreme Court enforced these traditional 
principles. Although the Court could not, on direct review, 
police state court assertions of personal jurisdiction because 
they presented no federal question, it could ensure compliance 
with the Full Faith and Credit Clause at the recognition stage.250 
And the Court only required states to enforce judgments that 
comported with traditional principles.251 As Stephen Sachs 
documents, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the manner of 
federal supervision but not the content of it.252 It allowed the 
Court to directly review state court judgments rendered 
without due process. And a state asserting jurisdiction beyond 
its sovereignty was understood to deny due process.253  
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes a 
liberty interest in not being subject to jurisdiction by a state 
reaching beyond its sovereignty in a system of interstate 
federalism. By protecting that liberty interest, the Court 
enforces an equilibrium between the states. Although Pennoyer 
v. Neff’s in-state service rule has given way to International Shoe’s 
minimum contacts standard, Pennoyer’s basic regime still exists. 
International Shoe’s minimum contacts rule still focuses on 
territorial contacts, making state borders central to the inquiry. 
If anything, International Shoe strengthened the Court’s role in 
policing interstate federalism by articulating the relatedness 
element, empowering the Supreme Court to decide whether a 
claim was related to the forum state.  
Let us return to Justice Sotomayor’s question: “What interest 
could any single State have in adjudicating respondents’ claims 
 
250. See id. at 1280–82.  
251. See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 176 (1850) (“[T]he international law as it 
existed among the States in 1790 was, that a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind 
the person of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign State, when the defendant had 
not been served with process . . . .”); Sachs, supra note 246, at 1280–82.  
252. See Sachs, supra note 246, at 1288 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment altered the prevailing 
jurisdictional rules by adjusting the mechanisms of appellate review.”). 
253. See id. at 1288–89; see also Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: 
Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 715 (2015) 
(“[T]he Court has made federalism an integral part of its due process jurisprudence by stating 
that a defendant has a liberty interest in being subjected only to lawful judgments.”). 
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that the other states do not share?”254 It is the same interest a 
state had pre-Fourteenth Amendment: protecting its own 
sovereignty by refusing to recognize a sister state’s overreach. 
The key difference is that the Supreme Court on direct review, 
rather than the states at the recognition phase, now protects this 
interest. Even if California would like to dispense its sense of 
justice in resolving claims arising in other states, it cannot do so 
because other states have the same desire. Without some federal 
policing, plaintiffs could pick any forum they desired, allowing 
pro-plaintiff states to essentially force their law on individuals 
in other states. To those committed to preserving basic equality 
and peace among the states, personal jurisdiction’s relatedness 
element is an important tool.  
IV. PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS 
After a long history of obscurity, the Court’s decision in 
Bristol-Myers provides an opportunity to reconsider the 
relationship between federal courts and pendent personal 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the case and the doctrine are linked. 
Attempting to shield class actions from Bristol-Myers’ 
implications, courts have expanded pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction to facilitate the easier joinder of parties via pendent 
party personal jurisdiction.255 This Article argues that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Bristol-Myers, 
currently bars the federal courts from exercising both forms of 
pendent personal jurisdiction.   
At the start, it is worth clarifying what I am not arguing. This 
Article is not suggesting that Congress lacks the power to 
authorize either pendent party or pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction. There are undoubtedly valid policy arguments in 
favor of pendent personal jurisdiction.256 If Congress decided 
 
254. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
255. See supra Section I.C.  
     256.   Either form of pendent personal jurisdiction would arguably facilitate the more efficient 
resolution of disputes by the federal courts. Pendent claim personal jurisdiction would 
generally not impose a substantial burden on defendants, as the anchor claim would already 
274 DREXEL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:215 
 
that public policy favored legislative reform, that law would be 
evaluated under the Fifth Amendment. Under the Fifth 
Amendment, it would not be difficult for the plaintiffs in a 
particular case to establish that their claim arises from contacts 
with the territory of the relevant sovereign: the United States.  
Instead, this Article argues that Congress simply has not 
authorized the federal courts to exercise either type of pendent 
personal jurisdiction. At least in most cases, a federal court 
cannot wield broader personal jurisdiction than the state court 
across the street. Because the federal courts must usually rely 
on the same state long-arm statutes as the state courts, both 
types of courts typically confront the same Fourteenth 
Amendment limitations—motivated largely by interstate 
federalism concerns—on personal jurisdiction articulated by 
the Supreme Court. Because Congress has not expanded the 
scope of the federal courts’ process, the federal courts cannot 
maintain pendent personal jurisdiction. 
A. Pendent Party Personal Jurisdiction 
Dozens of district courts have confronted the issue of pendent 
party personal jurisdiction within the last year. However, 
Bristol-Myers should be understood to rule it out, effectively 
limiting where multistate mass and class actions can be 
brought. This is undoubtedly a significant legal development.   
 
force them to litigate in a particular forum. Cf. Bradt & Rave, supra note 210, at 1253 (observing 
that it was not logistically inconvenient for BMS to litigate the out-of-state claims in California 
because it had to litigate the in-state claims there). On the other hand, both types would promote 
forum shopping by plaintiffs, especially those bringing state-law claims. They would likely seek 
to benefit from the Supreme Court’s decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., which held 
that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive choice-of-law 
rules of the state it sits in, thus often allowing plaintiffs to forum shop for the favorable 
substantive laws of particular states. 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941) (“The conflict of laws rules to be 
applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state 
courts.”). That risk arguably creates interstate federalism problems by effectively allowing the 
substantive laws of pro-plaintiff states to govern disputes from around the country. 
Admittedly, pendent claim personal jurisdiction would represent a substantially more modest 
step in this direction than pendent party personal jurisdiction. The former doctrine (absent a 
nationwide service of process statute) requires that an individual plaintiff bring at least one 
claim with some connection to the forum state, whereas the latter features no such limitation.  
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Crucially, the Court noted that “a connection between the 
forum and the specific claims at issue” is required.257 Consider 
the Court’s analysis of the facts in Bristol-Myers as they pertain 
to the relatedness element:    
 
The [California] Supreme Court found that 
specific jurisdiction was present without 
identifying any adequate link between the State 
and the nonresidents’ claims. As noted, the 
nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in 
California, did not purchase Plavix in California, 
did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not 
injured by Plavix in California.258  
 
Put another way, the Court demands a link between the 
forum state and each of the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims. 
Speaking even more directly to the point, the Court declared 
that third-party relationships do not authorize circumventing 
this rule:  
 
The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, 
obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and 
allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the 
nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert 
specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims. 
As we have explained, a defendant’s relationship 
with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an 
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.  This remains 
true even when third parties (here, the plaintiffs 
who reside in California) can bring claims similar 
to those brought by the nonresidents.259 
 
 
257. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  
258. See id. 
259. See id. (quotations omitted). 
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The key takeaway is that a defendant’s relationship with a 
third party does not enable specific personal jurisdiction. That 
is the entire rationale behind pendent party personal 
jurisdiction, so Bristol-Myers plainly rules it out.  
Courts and litigants have advanced three arguments to avoid 
this conclusion. First, a small number of district courts have 
claimed that Bristol-Myers only applies to state courts, and not 
to federal courts.260 They have noted that the Court explicitly 
left open the question of whether its decision applied to the 
federal courts.261 However, as one district court observed, the 
Court reserved that issue because it was not presented in the 
case before it; there is no need to unduly infer from its 
prudential reservation.262 Additionally, as one district court 
recently reasoned, it seems odd that concerns rooted in 
interstate federalism could limit the federal courts, instruments 
of a sovereignty higher than the states.263 At first blush, this 
argument seems logical. However, as discussed above, it is well 
settled that federal court assertions of pendent personal 
jurisdiction are generally governed by state law, and hence 
subject to the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.264 
If this seems odd, the Court applied this framework in both 
Daimler and Walden v. Fiore.265 Moreover, the federal courts’ 
personal jurisdiction has been tethered to state boundaries since 
 
260. See, e.g., Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018); 
supra Section I.C.1. 
261. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84 (“Since our decision concerns the due process 
limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the 
Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a 
federal court.”). 
262. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 
4224723, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (“Fitzhenry-Russell confuses the Supreme Court’s 
leaving the issue . . . open with the Supreme Court affirmatively stating that Bristol-
Myers necessarily would not apply to federal courts. Because the Bristol-Myers fact pattern did 
not involve a federal court, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to confront that issue.”). 
263. See Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 859. 
264. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
265. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 125–29 (2014) (detailing the analytical 
framework when a federal court asserts personal jurisdiction under state law); Walden v. Fiore, 
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (analyzing Nevada federal court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction 
under Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases).  
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1789.266 In other words, it’s nothing new. Unsurprisingly, the 
majority of courts that have considered this issue have 
concluded that Bristol-Myers does apply to the federal courts.  
Second, a small number of courts have suggested that Bristol-
Myers may apply to federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction, but not federal question jurisdiction.267 This 
rationale does not withstand scrutiny. The requirement that a 
federal court have statutory authorization to wield personal 
jurisdiction applies regardless of what type of subject matter 
jurisdiction the court is applying. Unless a federal claim is 
created by a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of 
process, the federal court must rely on the long-arm statute of 
the state it sits in. Since most federal laws do not include 
nationwide service of process provisions, the analysis usually 
entails the same two questions as when a federal court exercises 
diversity jurisdiction: does the state long-arm statute authorize 
jurisdiction, and is it consistent with the Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment cases?268 When a federal statute does authorize 
nationwide process, pendent party personal jurisdiction is 
unnecessary. Either way, the type of subject matter jurisdiction 
wielded by a federal court is irrelevant. The relevant statute and 
its attendant constitutional limitations are what matter. 
Third, a greater number of courts have insisted Bristol-Myers 
does not apply to class actions.269 Several district courts have 
carefully differentiated between the mass action at issue in 
Bristol-Myers and class actions. They have suggested that, 
unlike in mass actions, absent class members are not true 
parties to the litigation.270 They have also pointed to other 
 
266. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  
267. See supra Section I.C.2.  
268. For an example of a case that identifies this clearly, see Roy v. Fed-Ex Ground Package 
Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-30116-KAR, 2018 WL 2324092, at *3 (D. Mass. May 22, 2018). 
269. See supra Section I.C.3. 
270. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. 
Ga. 2018) (“In a mass tort action such as Bristol–Myers, each plaintiff is a real party in interest, 
meaning that each plaintiff is personally named and required to effect service. In contrast, 
claims asserted in a class action, such as those in the action presently before the Court, are 
prosecuted through representatives on behalf of absent class members.” (citations omitted)).  
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special rules that apply to class actions, like the fact that the 
absent class members’ citizenship does not affect diversity 
jurisdiction.271 One can also observe that some courts have not 
required plaintiffs to prove that all absent class members have 
standing.272 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that 
nonnamed plaintiffs “may be parties for some purposes and not 
for others . . . based on context.”273  
Here, context suggests that nonnamed plaintiffs are parties 
for personal jurisdiction purposes. First, personal jurisdiction 
concerns a defendant’s personal right to Fourteenth Amendment 
due process.274 In contrast, special rules for diversity 
jurisdiction and standing concern the federal courts’ power, 
implicating the personal rights of litigants only indirectly.275 
 
271. See, e.g., id. at 1369; see also Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (stating that courts 
need not consider the citizenship of absent class members when confirming diversity 
jurisdiction). In Sanchez, the court cited Shutts to argue that Bristol-Myers does not apply. See 
Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1369 (“If due process was not offended in Shutts, a class-action in 
State court with absent non-resident plaintiff class members, it is not offended by a potential 
class-action in federal court where the plaintiff class is made up in part with non-resident 
members.”). This misinterprets Shutts, where the defendant argued the plaintiffs’ due process 
rights were violated. The defendant did not suggest that its own due process right was violated, 
presumably because it thought itself subject to general personal jurisdiction in a pre-Daimler 
world. In Shutts, the Court emphasized that due process rules were different for absent class 
members because litigation burdened them less than defendants. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985). Shutts is simply not relevant in this context.  
272. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 306 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (“[W]hether an action presents a ‘case or controversy’ under Article III is determined 
vis-a-vis the named parties.”). 
273. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.  
274. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 
(“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. 
It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty.”).  
275 275.   One could argue that this question implicates the longstanding debate on the nature of 
the class action. One camp suggests that class actions are merely a form of joinder, while the 
other articulates a “representational model, [which] places much greater importance on the 
named class representative.” Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational 
Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 460. Although this debate is deeply interesting, I do not think it 
is particularly relevant to the question of whether pendent party personal jurisdiction is 
legitimate when class actions are involved. The representational model’s focus on the named 
representative will explain some unique rules for class actions, but not others. For example, 
Judge Wood explains that embracing the representational model over the joinder model should 
lead one to be less concerned about the personal jurisdiction rights of absent plaintiff members 
of the class, because Rule 23’s requirement that they be adequately represented by the named 
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Acknowledging the need for flexible federal court power to 
adjudicate class actions does not necessarily justify eliminating 
defendants’ personal rights. Further, defendants have a 
practical interest in seeing this right respected; exempting class 
actions from the Bristol-Myers framework would potentially 
allow one plaintiff to subject a defendant to nationwide liability 
under any state’s laws, enabling extreme forum shopping 
capabilities. Second and relatedly, suggesting that defendants’ 
rights vary in mass actions versus class actions runs up against 
the Rules Enabling Act, which mandates that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 cannot alter defendants’ substantive 
rights.276 Third, the Court’s solicitude for interstate federalism 
clashes with carving an exception for class actions. Indeed, 
particular states (and the federal courts sitting within) have a 
reputation for liberally certifying multistate class actions 
encompassing claims from other states.277 Arguably, a 
multistate class action is the manner in which a state can most 
aggressively assert its court system at the expense of other 
states, thus causing interstate federalism damage.278 Finally, this 
approach effects an end-run around Bristol-Myers. It would 
allow plaintiffs to enable a state (or a federal court sitting 
within) to adjudicate claims unrelated to it simply by using 
class representatives from that state. Indeed, one California 
district court explicitly blessed this effort, acknowledging it was 
 
plaintiffs protects their interests. See id. at 504–05. It is difficult to see how that logic would 
support watering down a defendant’s due process right to be exposed to liability only by courts 
authorized to adjudicate all the claims against it.  
276. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”). 
277. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, California’s Food Court: Where Lawyers Never Go Hungry, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2013, 6:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-
22/californias-food-court-where-lawyers-never-go-hungry (describing the pro-consumer class 
action reputation of California’s federal courts).  
278. This was a driving motivation behind the Class Action Fairness Act. See S. REP. No. 109-
14 (2005) (“[F]requently in such cases [where certain state courts certified nationwide class 
actions], there appears to be state court provincialism against out-of-state defendants or a 
judicial failure to recognize the interests of other states in the litigation.”). 
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letting plaintiffs “manipulate[] their complaint so as not to run 
afoul of Bristol-Myers.”279 The Court will likely not let plaintiffs 
circumvent its ruling.280   
In short, Bristol-Myers applies in federal court and to class 
actions. Admittedly, personal jurisdiction rules are making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring multistate class actions on 
their preferred terms, especially where defendants are not 
amenable to general personal jurisdiction.281 Wishful thinking 
about Bristol-Myers—which demands a connection between 
each claim and the forum state—will not ultimately counter that 
tide. Although some lower courts have suggested Bristol-Myers, 
which purported to modestly extend existing precedent, was 
not intended to impact class actions, nothing in Court’s 
reasoning suggests a carveout is forthcoming.282 It is also 
difficult to argue the Court was unaware of the decision’s 
potential impact on class actions. Indeed, an amicus brief 
warned that deciding in BMS’s favor would cause “dramatic” 
consequences for multistate class actions, whereby the “only 
available forum would [often] be in the defendant's home 
state.”283 Because pendent party personal jurisdiction in class 
actions does not require a connection between each claim and 
the forum state, it is inconsistent with the Court’s decision. 
Moreover, it is not the role of the federal courts to expand 
their own jurisdiction for policy reasons.  Fundamentally, the 
Constitution empowers Congress to define the jurisdiction of 
 
279. Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).  
280. See also Dodson, supra note 4, at 31 (stating that the argument against Bristol-Myers’ 
applicability to class actions “seems to be in tension with the Supreme Court’s current trend 
narrowing personal jurisdiction and its current skepticism of class aggregation”). 
281. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 210, 1318–19. 
     282. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 532 (“Nothing in Justice Alito’s opinion provides 
a plausible ground for distinguishing class actions . . . from the consolidated mass actions before 
the Court.”). 
283. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support of Respondents at 16-
17, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466).  
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the federal courts.284 Within a system of separated powers, 
Congress’s prerogative suggests the federal courts, at most, 
have a limited ability to expand their own jurisdiction.285 One 
longstanding limitation—first established by Congress in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789286 and now codified in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure by the Supreme Court’s exercise of delegated 
legislative authority287—is that federal courts must have 
statutory authority to wield personal jurisdiction.  
At the very least, Congress has left undisturbed a rule that 
often has the effect of tying federal court jurisdiction to state 
borders.288 In cases where a federal court relies on a state long-
arm statute to maintain personal jurisdiction, it is well 
 
284.  See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (How.) 441, 449 (1850); see also See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 
(“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).  
285. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547 (1989) (“[C]ourts which are created by 
written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that 
jurisdiction.” (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93  (1807))).  
286. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the role of the Judiciary Act in 
this history is not entirely clear. Scholars and judges have debated whether the Judiciary Act 
regulated personal jurisdiction, merely the method of service of process, or venue. Compare 
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l., 320 F.2d 219, 228 n.10 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J.) (asserting 
that section 11 of the Judiciary Act merely regulated venue and not personal jurisdiction), with 
id. at 238 (Clark, J., dissenting) (asserting that section 11 of the Judiciary Act regulated both 
personal jurisdiction and venue), and Foster, Jr., supra note 152, at 79 n.15 (agreeing with Judge 
Clark’s view). Even if one concludes section 11 of the Judiciary Act had nothing to do with 
personal jurisdiction, others have argued that section 34 of the Judiciary Act, better known as 
the Rules of Decision Act, requires federal courts to sometimes rely on the long-arm statute of 
the states they sit in. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
711–12 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Kelleher, supra note 142, at 1211–12 (agreeing 
with Justice Powell’s interpretation). Under either view, Congress has, since 1789, regulated the 
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
287. For an explanation of how the Supreme Court exercises delegated legislative authority 
under the Rules Enabling Act, see Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Class Actions, 
Statutes of Limitations and Repose, and Federal Common Law, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (2018).  
288. It is somewhat unclear whether this status quo is based solely on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k), or whether it is also required by statute. For example, Justice Powell argued in 
Bauxites that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to rely on state long-arm statutes 
for personal jurisdiction in diversity cases. See Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring in 
judgment). That theoretical question aside, Congress can change the status quo if it wants to. 
Several scholars have noted that Congress can untether the personal jurisdiction of the federal 
courts from state borders. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1192 (2018) (“[A]lthough federal districts have always been 
organized according to state boundaries, they need not be under Article III, which gives 
Congress leeway to design a system of inferior courts as it sees fit.”). 
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established that the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment rules 
apply, meaning that geography limits the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.289 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers 
represents merely a continuation of traditional geographical 
limitations. Pendent party personal jurisdiction, if accepted, 
would destroy these limitations by allowing a federal court in 
any state to adjudicate similar claims from all fifty states as long 
as one plaintiff’s claim is connected to the state it sits in. In other 
words, it would be a dramatic expansion of the power of 
particular federal courts to adjudicate controversies—whether 
arising under state or federal law—from around the country. 
Whether motivated by a desire to facilitate judicial efficiency or 
to enable multistate class actions where the defendant is not 
amenable to general personal jurisdiction, federal courts play a 
constitutionally dubious game when they press the boundaries 
of their own jurisdiction for policy reasons. Undoubtedly, there 
are valid policy arguments in favor of adjusting jurisdictional 
rules to make it easier for plaintiffs to bring class actions. But 
because the Constitution empowers Congress to decide 
whether to expand the federal courts’ jurisdiction, the courts 
should proceed cautiously in this area, lest they disturb the 
separation of powers.  
B. Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction 
During oral arguments for Bristol-Myers, Justice Sotomayor 
presciently suggested BMS’s stance would imperil pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction.290 First, this section affirms her 
concern. Although it may have once been an open question, the 
Court made clear that specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-
 
289. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Of course, there are exceptions. The Court’s 
general personal jurisdiction rules, prior to Daimler, were understood to effectively allow 
plaintiffs to sue major national corporations in most states for any cause of action. See Dodson, 
supra note 4, at 18 (citing Wal-Mart as an example of such a corporation).  
290. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466); see also Dodson, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that Bristol-
Myers can be read to prohibit pendent claim personal jurisdiction); Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 
529–30 (stating that pendent personal jurisdiction’s status is “unsettled” after Bristol-Myers).  
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specific inquiry. Consequently, pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction cannot survive under existing law.  
Second, this section will confront some broader questions 
about specific personal jurisdiction. How close of a relationship 
does the relatedness element require between the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts and a claim, and what role does interstate 
federalism play? This Article concludes that Bristol-Myers left 
these questions open and offers suggestions for further 
doctrinal development of the relatedness element. 
Finally, this section observes that courts may have an 
alternative jurisdictional option in some cases where pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction has been incorrectly applied.    
1. Specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry, so 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction is forbidden  
Bristol-Myers confirms that specific personal jurisdiction is a 
claim-specific inquiry. This question is essential because 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction’s validity depends on it not 
being a claim-specific inquiry. Consider, for example, the facts 
of ESAB Group v. Centricut, Inc.: using the RICO statute’s 
nationwide service of process provision to bring RICO claims, 
the plaintiff also brought state-law claims in a South Carolina 
federal court concerning activities by the defendant with no 
connection to South Carolina.291 If specific personal jurisdiction 
is a claim-specific inquiry, pendent personal jurisdiction in 
cases like ESAB is invalid, because the state-law claims cannot 
independently satisfy the relatedness element. 
The Court’s language in Bristol-Myers suggests specific 
personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry. For example, 
the Court states that a “connection between the forum and 
specific claims at issue” is required.292 The Court’s criticism of 
California’s approach highlights the centrality of this assertion: 
 
 
291. See 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997). 
292. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (emphasis added). 
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Under the California approach, the strength of the 
requisite connection between the forum and the 
specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant 
has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to 
those claims. Our cases provide no support for 
this approach, which resembles a loose and 
spurious form of general jurisdiction. For specific 
jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections 
with the forum are not enough.293  
 
Notice that the Court refers to “specific claims.” It is 
irrelevant if the defendant has “extensive forum contacts that 
are unrelated” to those specific claims. The implication is that 
each claim in a lawsuit must be related to the forum state.  
This is true even though Justice Alito quoted more 
ambiguous language from earlier cases. Quoting Helicopteros 
and Daimler, the Court said specific personal jurisdiction rules 
require that the “suit must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”294 The Court did not use 
the narrower word “claim,” but the more ambiguous word 
“suit.” A “suit” can seemingly refer either to a claim or the 
broader lawsuit.295 Quoting Goodyear Dunlop, the Court said 
there must be: 
 
an affiliation between the forum and the 
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity 
or an occurrence that takes place in the forum 
State and is therefore subject to the State’s 
regulation . . . . specific jurisdiction is confined to 
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected 
 
293. See id. 
294. See id. (emphasis added). 
295. Indeed, one court has seized upon this ambiguity to justify pendent party personal 
jurisdiction as to unnamed class plaintiffs. See Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00085, 
2018 WL 3580775, at *6 (W.D. Va. July 25, 2018) (quoting the Court’s use of the word “suit” to 
argue it “framed the substantive right at [a] level of generality” justifying its decision).  
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with, the very controversy that establishes 
jurisdiction.296  
 
Again, the word controversy is amenable to either the narrow 
meaning of “claim” or the broader meaning of “claims within a 
controversy.”  
However, the Court’s underlying logic suggests that specific 
personal jurisdiction must be a claim-specific inquiry. The 
Court demands separation between specific and general 
personal jurisdiction, insisting they are “very different” from 
each other.297 Therefore, specific personal jurisdiction must be a 
claim-specific inquiry. Central to its definition is that it covers 
claims with a specific connection to the forum state. Ever since 
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman coined 
the terms, the defining difference between general and specific 
personal jurisdiction is that only the latter requires a 
relationship between a claim and the defendant’s forum-state 
contacts.298 That is what differentiates specific from general 
personal jurisdiction. 
Another problem with California’s sliding-scale approach, 
according to the Court, is that it transforms specific personal 
jurisdiction into a “spurious form of general personal 
jurisdiction.”299 And that is the fatal flaw with pendent claim 
jurisdiction: it is also a “spurious form” of general personal 
jurisdiction. Pendent claim personal jurisdiction blends the two 
types of categories together; it essentially says that a state can 
adjudicate claims not sufficiently related to the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts without general personal jurisdiction. In 
Bristol-Myers, the Court made clear it will not tolerate such 
blending.300  
Because specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific 
inquiry, pendent claim personal jurisdiction is legally dubious. 
 
296. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (emphasis added). 
297. See id. 
298. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 195, at 1136. 
299.  See 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
300.  See id. 
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The whole point of pendent claim personal jurisdiction is to 
allow jurisdiction over claims that, independently, might not 
satisfy the elements of specific personal jurisdiction.  
Since Bristol-Myers, however, district courts are taking a range 
of approaches to pendent claim personal jurisdiction. Some are 
refusing to apply it, others are still partially accepting it,301 and 
some are continuing to apply it as before.302 As appellate courts 
consider pendent claim personal jurisdiction after Bristol-Myers, 
it is worth watching whether they will reexamine their 
precedents in light of the Court’s decision. 
2. Interstate federalism should require a connection between each 
claim and the forum state, but not much more 
As discussed above, Bristol-Myers establishes, in the name of 
interstate federalism, a Fourteenth Amendment rule that state 
courts cannot adjudicate a claim unrelated to the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts. As long as the process of the district courts 
remains tethered to state law, the federal courts will often be 
subject to the same interstate federalism limitations on personal 
jurisdiction as the state courts. That reality adds urgency to the 
unresolved question of how broad the relatedness element is. 
Although the Court did not decide in Bristol-Myers how broad 
the relatedness element is, it gave some clues.  
As discussed above, the Court required that there be some 
relationship between the claim and the defendant’s forum-state 
contacts. But how much of a relationship is required? The Court 
declined BMS’s invitation to establish a “proximate cause” test 
for relatedness.303 But the Court also gave clues as to what types 
of relationships are insufficient, as it rejected those asserted by 
California. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in dissent, the out-
of-state plaintiffs’ claims were related to BMS’s forum-state 
 
301. See Spratley v. FCA U.S. LLC, 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12 
2017) (rejecting pendent claim personal jurisdiction in a diversity case but not questioning the 
validity of pendent claim personal jurisdiction in nationwide service of process cases). 
302. See supra Section I.B.  
303. See Brief for Petitioner at 37–46, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 
S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466). 
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contacts in a sense; they resulted from conduct by BMS that was 
“materially the same” as its activity in California.304 For Justice 
Sotomayor—like the California Supreme Court in 
Cornelison305—this relationship should be sufficient.306  
Aside from rejecting California’s proposed standard, it is 
unclear what degree of relatedness the Court will require 
between the claim and the defendant’s forum-state contacts. 
There are three potential approaches the Court can take. First, 
the Court could decline to enforce the requirement, throwing 
up its hands and pleading institutional incompetence. The 
Court effectively ruled this option out in Bristol-Myers. Second, 
the Court could acknowledge the difficulty of developing a 
judicially manageable standard and establish a deferential rule 
that gives the states (and, by extension, the federal courts) 
substantial latitude within limits. Third, the Court could 
aggressively police state assertions of personal jurisdiction. I 
recommend the second approach, but it is worth considering 
the third, which remains open.  
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Seiferth demonstrates how 
courts could aggressively police interstate federalism through 
the relatedness element. In Seiferth, where the court had 
personal jurisdiction as to three related claims, it declined to 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to a defective design claim, 
concluding that it did not “arise from” the defendant’s contacts 
with Mississippi because the defendant designed the product in 
Florida.307 Standing in isolation, there seems to be some 
relationship between the defective design claim and 
Mississippi. The product—which was designed in Florida— 
injured someone in Mississippi. Mississippi certainly seems to 
have some interest in regulating the design of a product that 
ultimately killed someone within its borders. Implicitly, 
Seiferth’s relatedness element balanced the interests of 
Mississippi and Florida, privileging Florida’s potentially 
 
304. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
305. See 16 Cal. 3d 143, 146 (1976). 
306. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
307. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.  
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greater interest in providing a forum308 and applying its own 
substantive law.309 Here, the Fifth Circuit essentially umpired 
between Florida and Mississippi, determining Florida was the 
better fit.  
Although the Court could aggressively police interstate 
federalism through the relatedness element, the Court’s choice-
of-law jurisprudence demonstrates why it should not do so. 
Within the choice-of-law realm, there was a longstanding 
debate on whether the Constitution gave federal courts the 
authority to balance between competing state interests to strike 
down a state’s application of its own law.310 Although the Court 
once blessed a balancing of state interests in evaluating a state’s 
application of its own law,311 it backtracked four years later, 
suggesting that a state can apply its own law as long as it has 
an interest in the claim.312 In part, the Court’s decision seems 
 
308. This Article deliberately focuses on the power to provide a forum, rather than the 
power of a state to have its substantive law applied. Different states have different choice-of-
law rules, and it is possible the federal court in Seiferth, applying Mississippi’s choice of law 
rules, would have ultimately applied Florida substantive law to the defective design claim. 
However, there are many situations where a forum state will, for public policy reasons, choose 
to apply its own law, perhaps because it thinks its public policy is better. See Brilmayer, supra 
note 205, at 83 n.9. Because the Supreme Court has developed minimal constitutional limitations 
on a forum state’s application of its own substantive law, such choices will rarely be struck 
down. See id. Another potential interstate federalism concern is that states have an interest in 
developing their own substantive law rather than letting other states do so. See David A. Skeel, 
The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 20–21 (2017) (arguing the Delaware 
legislature has taken several steps to ensure Delaware courts apply the state’s own corporate 
law, including passing a statute only allowing exclusive forum clauses in corporate charters or 
bylaws if they include Delaware as a forum).  
309. Florida would, presumably, apply its own substantive law. But denying personal 
jurisdiction to Mississippi does not guarantee that Florida will get to provide a forum or apply 
its own substantive law. Instead, the plaintiff could sue the defendant in his home state, 
Tennessee, which could then presumably apply its substantive law to the dispute within 
constitutional bounds.  
310. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires federal courts 
to “impose uniformity in choice of law problems” because it was designed “to federalize the 
separate and independent state legal systems by the overriding principle of reciprocal 
recognition”); KAY ET AL., supra note 143, at 359–64.  
311. See Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 549–50 (1935) 
(“[California’s] interest is sufficient to justify its legislation and is greater than that of  
Alaska . . . .”).   
312. See Pacific Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939) 
(“Although Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massachusetts 
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motivated by a lack of a judicially manageable standard to 
evaluate competing claims.313 Further, although federal 
policing of state choice-of-law decisions might promote more 
equality between states, it would subject state assertions of 
jurisdiction to an open-ended balancing test, creating a 
“diminution of state power.”314 Consequently, in Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Hague, the Court adopted the deferential, 
judicially manageable rule that a state could apply its own law 
to a claim as long as the state has “significant” contacts with 
it.315 This rule adequately protects interstate federalism—
forbidding overreach by states to adjudicate claims they have 
no interest in—while adopting a judicially manageable 
standard that avoids undermining the power of all the states.  
Taking a lesson from Allstate, the Court should use personal 
jurisdiction’s relatedness element to ensure the forum state’s 
court has a regulatory interest in adjudicating the claims before 
it.316 Indeed, one can interpret International Shoe as an attempt 
ensure that the forum state has a regulatory interest in the 
suit.317 The term “regulatory interest” is admittedly vague; it 
 
employees while temporarily abroad in the course of their employment, and may adopt that 
policy for itself, that could hardly be thought to support an application of the full faith and 
credit clause which would override the constitutional authority of another state to legislative 
for the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within it.”).  
313. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495–96 (2003) (explaining that the balancing 
approach of Alaska Packers “quickly proved unsatisfactory” and that “[i]n light of this 
experience, we abandoned the balancing of interests approach”). But see Kermit Roosevelt III, 
The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2528–29 (1999) (proposing 
a deferential non-discrimination standard for policing state choice-of-law decisions).  
314. Elliot E. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 588 (1953). 
315. See 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (“[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary 
nor fundamentally unfair.”). 
316. The term “regulatory interest” has appeared in the personal jurisdiction context 
multiple times. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting in 
part) (“State courts have legitimately read their jurisdiction expansively when a cause of action 
centers in an area in which the forum State possesses a manifest regulatory interest.”); see also 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (explaining that 
specific personal jurisdiction principally depends on an “activity or an occurrence that takes 
place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.”).  
317. Professor Burbank suggests International Shoe can be understood as requiring a state to 
have a regulatory interest as part of a due process balancing test. See also Hayward D. Reynolds, 
The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 
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does not automatically decide individual cases. But it conveys 
an attitude: the federal courts should not aggressively umpire 
between multiple states that have legitimate interests in 
adjudicating a claim. Rather, it should be enough that a state 
has some regulatory interest. Although the full spectrum of state 
interests cannot be catalogued, most are connected with the 
state’s police power: protecting those within its borders. As 
with other deferential tests, like the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
rational basis test, courts should proceed cautiously before 
concluding a state lacks a regulatory interest in a particular 
claim. Demanding more is likely not judicially manageable.318 
Under this test, a Mississippi court should be able to adjudicate 
the defective design claim presented in Seiferth, as Mississippi 
undoubtedly had a regulatory interest in regulating machinery 
injuring people within its borders, even if it was designed out-
of-state. This rule is faithful to Bristol-Myers; it ensures that a 
state with no legitimate interest in adjudicating a claim will not 
do so.319 It also limits the judiciary’s line-drawing challenge and 
avoids unduly diminishing the power of the state courts.   
3. Pendent claim personal jurisdiction is often unnecessary.  
As Section IV.B.1 demonstrates, Bristol-Myers instructs that 
specific personal jurisdiction requires each claim in a lawsuit be 
related to the forum state. Because the whole point of pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction is that an independent relationship 
 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 854 (1991) (describing personal jurisdiction rules as a form of 
procedural due process). There is some support for this view. The Court started with the 
acknowledgment that a defendant’s presence in a state is what traditionally gave its courts 
power to issue a binding judgment, because the state had regulatory power over those within 
its borders. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). But, as the Court went on 
to explain, a corporation’s presence in a state can only be manifested by the actions of its agents 
within. Id. at 317. Thus, “the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those 
activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of due process.” Id. at 316–17. This language suggests the Court envisioned 
a due process balancing test where contacts weighed in the calculus.  
318. Courts have long established doctrinal tests recognizing their limited institutional 
competence. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 29 (1953) (deferentially reviewing 
congressional action under the Tax Clause because “a final definition of the line between state 
and federal power has baffled judges and legislators”). 
319. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
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with the forum state is not required for each claim, the doctrine 
is forbidden.  However, it is also sometimes unnecessary. In the 
situations where courts might be most tempted to apply 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction, they could instead 
consider more carefully whether specific personal jurisdiction 
independently exists as to the “pendent” claims.  
Courts, state and federal, are currently divided on what the 
proper test for the relatedness element is.320 Some courts apply 
a relatively demanding standard, requiring the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts be a proximate cause of the claim. Other 
courts apply a relaxed but-for standard, which usually allows 
personal jurisdiction as long as an event relevant to the lawsuit 
took place in the forum state. Others have staked out a middle 
ground. The Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers does not establish 
a uniform standard, leaving this diversity in place for now. 
Whatever a jurisdiction’s particular test is, courts that may be 
tempted to resort to pendent claim personal jurisdiction should 
first ask whether it is even necessary. If one of the plaintiff’s 
claims is related to the forum state, and the other claims arise 
from the same nucleus of operative fact, then the other claims 
may have a sufficiently close relationship with the forum state 
to independently justify specific personal jurisdiction. Outside 
the nationwide service of process cases, the first condition must 
be true, and most courts applying pendent claim personal 
jurisdiction already require the second condition as well.321  
To see how this will sometimes be the case, consider again the 
facts of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Seiferth. Camus, an 
engineer, designed a helicopter platform for his employer, Air2. 
Although Camus designed the platform in Florida, he 
transported it to Mississippi and, while there, installed it on 
Air2’s helicopter.322 The plaintiff, an inspector, died after the 
platform broke in Mississippi. The plaintiff’s estate then 
brought four claims—defective design, failure to warn, 
 
320. See supra notes 199–208 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
322. See Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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negligence, and negligence per se—in a Mississippi federal 
court.323 The Fifth Circuit ultimately found specific personal 
jurisdiction existed as to the failure to warn, negligence, and 
negligence per se claims, but it determined the Fourteenth 
Amendment barred jurisdiction as to the defective design 
claim.324 Justifying its conclusion that the claim was not 
sufficiently related to the defendant’s forum state contacts, the 
court observed that Camus had designed the platform in 
Florida, not Mississippi.  
However, this analysis may be too stingy. Under the 
Mississippi Products Liability Act, which governed the 
defective design claim, the plaintiff must prove (among other 
things) that “the product failed to perform as expected.”325 In 
this case, the platform failed to perform as expected in 
Mississippi, the forum state. Thus, Camus’s forum-state 
contacts are an important part of the plaintiff’s defective design 
claim, and under any existing relatedness standard, the federal 
court probably could have adjudicated this entire case without 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction.  
For another example, consider our ongoing hypothetical.326 
The court would have specific personal jurisdiction as to 
Capias’s fraud claim, since the effects of the fraud were felt in 
the forum state. But what about the breach of contract claim? 
Admittedly, the contract was negotiated entirely in Virginia, so 
that state likely has the strongest nexus with the claim. But one 
element of a breach of contract claim is the question of whether 
a breach occurred. Even if the fact is not vigorously disputed, 
the number of computers shipped to California by 
RespondendCo is relevant to determining whether a breach 
occurred, so those shipments are arguably a but-for cause of the 
breach of contract claim. The visits to California by 
RespondendCo’s representatives are also pertinent to the 
question of breach. Thus, in at least some jurisdictions, the 
 
323. See id. at 274.  
324. See id. at 275.  
325. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (2013). 
326. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.  
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breach of contract claim does arise from the defendant’s forum-
state contacts, and pendent claim personal jurisdiction would 
be entirely unnecessary. Indeed, in the real-life version of the 
case, the Ninth Circuit (reversing the district court) concluded 
specific personal jurisdiction did exist independently for the 
breach of contract claim, making it unnecessary to resort to 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction.327  
Seiferth and the hypothetical demonstrate that pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction will sometimes not be necessary to 
adjudicate a group of claims where an anchor claim is clearly 
related to the defendant’s forum-state contacts and the other 
claims are related to the anchor claim. Intuitively, that makes 
sense. If A is related to B, and B is related to C, there is likely at 
least some nexus between A and C. In other words, before 
federal courts consider employing a tool not properly available 
to them, they should ask if they can exercise jurisdiction under 
established doctrine.  
Of course, this analysis does not apply to cases where a 
nationwide service of process provision authorized the court’s 
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to an anchor claim, 
and the anchor claim is not otherwise related to the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts.  Recall the facts of ESAB, where the South 
Carolina federal court used pendent claim personal jurisdiction 
to adjudicate state-law claims with no connection to South 
Carolina.328 There, the anchor claim was a RICO claim (so 
personal jurisdiction was authorized by a nationwide service of 
process provision), yet none of the pertinent events that made 
up that claim occurred in South Carolina. Thus, the related 
state-law claims were also, unsurprisingly, entirely 
unconnected with South Carolina. This Article has argued that 
the South Carolina federal court lacked authority to adjudicate 
the pendent claims in this case.  
But I also submit that this is a good policy outcome. Because 
none of the events in this case involved South Carolina—the 
 
327. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287–89, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977). 
328. See ESAB Grp., Inc., v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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Fourth Circuit acknowledged the defendant did not have 
minimum contacts there329—South Carolina lacked any 
regulatory interest in the state-law claims. Further, it made no 
sense to burden South Carolina’s people—for example, through 
jury duty—in adjudicating claims unconnected to their state.330 
In contrast, it made good sense to adjudicate all of the Seiferth 
plaintiff’s claims in Mississippi. First, jurisdiction would be 
consistent with Bristol-Myers’ twin commands that specific 
personal jurisdiction be claim-specific, and that each claim have 
some connection to the forum state. Second, Mississippi had a 
clear regulatory interest in the case. A man was killed by 
Camus’s design within its territory, implicating the state’s 
strong interest in preserving public safety.331 This case is thus 
different than Bristol-Myers, where the Court concluded that 
California had “little legitimate interest” in the out-of-state 
plaintiffs’ claims.332 Third, burdening the local Mississippi 
community with the costs of adjudicating the claim is 
appropriate; a community’s interest in adjudicating a dispute 
implicating its safety is undeniably strong. 
In response, one could argue that, because the product was 
designed in Florida, Florida had an even stronger regulatory 
interest that might justify the Fifth Circuit’s decision to reserve 
adjudication of the plaintiff’s defective design claim to it. But 
the Court long ago discovered the difficulties inherent in 
policing between states’ competing interests in the choice-of-
law context.333 Moreover, choosing between multiple states 
with solid regulatory interests in adjudicating a claim would 
require a blurry and manipulable standard that puts state court 
assertions of personal jurisdiction at the mercy of federal law. 
 
329. See id. at 625–26. 
330. Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (“Jury duty is a burden that ought 
not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.”). 
331. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 338 n.5 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The 
State does have an interest in the safety of motorists who use its roads.”). 
332. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
333. See supra notes 310–15 and accompanying text.  
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Such a rule, justified by interstate federalism’s solicitude for the 
states, would come at a high cost if it demeaned them all.  
CONCLUSION 
In Bristol-Myers, the Court finally addressed the meaning of 
the relatedness requirement, the last element of specific 
personal jurisdiction that was mostly undefined. If nothing else, 
the Court’s opinion signals that the relatedness element has 
teeth, and litigants are already trying to find ways around it. 
One method is pendent party personal jurisdiction, which a 
substantial number of courts have embraced. Yet the Court’s 
opinion also sets the stage to overturn decades of pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the federal courts. If 
accepted, this Article’s analysis upends both types of pendent 
personal jurisdiction, creating several important implications. 
First, pendent party personal jurisdiction is plainly 
inconsistent with Bristol-Myers. This is true in both federal and 
state courts. Further, the rule should not vary for class actions. 
Although the combination of limited statutory authority for 
service of process and the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
decisions is putting pressure on multistate class actions in the 
federal courts, pendent party personal jurisdiction should not 
be used to circumvent the law. If the current law is unwise, 
Congress can always broaden the scope of the federal courts’ 
personal jurisdiction by extending the scope of their process. 
Second, state long-arm statutes are the only current, viable 
source of authority for pendent claim personal jurisdiction. 
Pendent claim personal jurisdiction is illegitimate in any state 
with a long-arm statute that does not authorize it, so the federal 
courts must articulate a basis under state law to exercise it. 
Federal precedents based on assertions of personal jurisdiction 
in states without full-extent statutes are dubious. The rationale 
of precedents like Hargrave—a case where the Second Circuit 
did not articulate a basis in state law when exercising pendent 
claim personal jurisdiction—should be rejected.   
Third, pendent claim personal jurisdiction in nationwide 
service of process cases will usually fail Bristol-Myers’ rule. The 
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nationwide service of process statutes cannot be fairly read to 
authorize it, which means jurisdiction must be consistent with 
state long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because these cases frequently involve pendent claims with no 
connection to the forum state, Bristol-Myers does not permit 
jurisdiction for such claims. Consequently, this Article 
challenges the viability of precedents allowing pendent claim 
personal jurisdiction in nationwide service of process cases—
for example, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in ESAB.  
Fourth, in states with full-extent long-arm statutes, specific 
personal jurisdiction will sometimes be possible over a group 
of related claims where one claim is related to the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts. If a court, understandably, wants to 
adjudicate these claims together, it should carefully consider 
whether each claim is sufficiently related to the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts. In such cases, where the argument for 
pendent claim personal jurisdiction would seem most 
appealing, it may be unnecessary. For example, specific 
personal jurisdiction as to all the claims should be possible in 
Seiferth and our ongoing hypothetical. 
 Finally, this Article urges caution as the courts continue 
developing personal jurisdiction law. As the Court’s choice-of-
law jurisprudence demonstrates, it is not wise to use 
constitutional law, a blunt instrument, to aggressively police 
between states’ competing adjudicative interests. While the line 
in Bristol-Myers seems easily enforceable, the Court should 
hesitate before demanding a relationship stronger than some 
relationship. Even in the status quo, the Court’s recent personal 
jurisdiction decisions are undoubtedly putting pressure on 
various forms of aggregation in complex litigation, particularly 
multistate class actions.  The lower federal courts, however, lack 
the authority to counter these pressures by ignoring the 
Supreme Court’s rules or expanding their jurisdiction beyond 
what Congress has authorized. Even if the status quo is 
unfortunate, pendent personal jurisdiction is not the answer.   
